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ABSTRACT 
The way physicians are paid for the provision of care is a relevant aspect of health care 
systems. Fee-for-service (FFS) payment system has been criticized for affecting quality of care, 
contributing to the fragmentation of health care, and for rising costs of health care systems. 
Alternative payment plans (APP) have been introduced as options to the traditional FFS payment 
scheme. Despite the link between payment methods and behavior of physicians that has been 
established; there is a lack of evidence about the impact of payment systems on wellness of 
physicians, specifically on their perception of professional equity and daily distress of 
physicians. The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of APP on physicians’ 
perceptions of professional equity and daily distress. The following questions guided this 
dissertation: 1) Does professional equity perceived by physicians vary among practitioners paid 
by FFS, APP, or blended alternatives? 2) Is the payment method associated with daily distress of 
medical practitioners? and 3) Are levels of professional equity, daily distress, and career 
satisfaction of physicians different by gender and payment methods? 
In 2011, a cross-sectional study was conducted with physicians practicing in the Saskatoon 
Health Region (SHR), the largest health authority of Saskatchewan, Canada. Physicians 
completed a questionnaire evaluating their perceptions of professional equity and daily distress. 
Analyses of variances (ANOVA) were performed to assess differences in professional equity 
(overall and by its fulfillment, financial, and recognition dimensions) and daily distress among 
physicians paid by FFS, APP, and blended schemes. As multivariable analyses, a linear 
regression was used to test the interaction between specialty and payment methods on the 
perception of professional equity, controlling for the number of patients, gender, and age group. 
A mixed linear regression model was built to predict daily distress, testing demographics, 
workload, complexity of patients, payment method, career satisfaction, and practice profile; the 
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random component of the model considered the influence of geographic area of practice. Also, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to evaluate differences among 
professional equity, daily distress, and career satisfaction by payment method and gender.  
In total, 382 (48.1%) physicians participated in the study. Response bias was tested and found 
to be negligible (Appendix F). The ANOVA identified that physicians paid by APP perceived 
higher professional equity than those paid by FFS (p=0.005), as well as higher levels of income 
(p=0.03) and recognition (p=0.001) equity than those with FFS. In the multivariable analyses, a 
higher level of professional equity was predicted among family practitioners (FPs) paid by APP 
and blended schemes in comparison to those paid by FFS. Additionally, the payment method was 
a predictor of daily distress when adjusted by other factors. Lower levels of distress were found 
among physicians who had more than 75% of patients with complex conditions and were paid by 
APP compared to those paid by FFS and blended methods. The MANOVA identified that female 
physicians had poorer wellness indicators than male practitioners. Multiple comparisons 
identified higher levels of equity among male physicians paid by APP than those with FFS, 
although this benefit was not observed among female ones. 
In conclusion, physicians paid by APP perceived higher professional equity (fair economic 
rewards and appropriate recognition) in comparison to those paid by FFS. Particularly, FPs paid 
by APP perceived higher professional equity than those FPs paid by FFS. Additionally, the 
payment method was identified as an associated factor with distress; lower levels of daily 
distress were predicted among physicians paid by APP who see high proportions of patients with 
complex conditions. Notwithstanding, female physicians had poorer wellness indicators and the 
impact of APP on professional equity was only distinguished among males. A potential unequal 
impact of APP must be recognized between female and male physicians. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
About 2,500 years ago, the growing city of Athens used “retaining fee(s)” to secure the 
services of medical practitioners of the time. These “civic doctors” had the right to charge fees to 
non-citizens and the freewill to provide services to citizens without charge [1]. This ancient 
scenario depicts the need to attract and retain physicians using payment policies, revealing the 
difficulty of defining and implementing a regular way to compensate Galen’s practitioners for 
their services. The painting “The Doctor” 1 by Sir Luke Fildes, done in 1891, illustrates a 
physician on a home visit in a humble cottage; a representation of medical practice and 
conditions of the labor class of that time [2, 3]. A physician is beside a suffering child lying on 
an improvised bed; the worried parents are at the back, almost in a corner, of the cottage [2]. As 
Jacalyn Duffin [3, p130] describes, the caring physician “comforts with his presence, even if he 
appears to offer little” medical help, and argues that “whether she (his patient) lives or dies, the 
parents will owe him money; whether or not he accepts their payment is another matter, but he 
certainly has the account in his ledger at home." 
Sick people and their families had an inequitable system in place to access health care in the 
eighteen century: pay fees according to a fee schedule (where illness could ruin families), attend 
places where charitable societies organized the provision of care, or simply do not have medical 
care [3]. Health care systems, both private and public, were launched at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth century. Two cardinal aims of these evolving health care 
systems were to eliminate the financial burden to access care and to ensure payment of health 
services [3]. 
                                                 
1 A picture of the painting entitled “The Doctor” of Sir Luke Fildes is available at the website of the 
TATE Gallery: http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/fildes-the-doctor-n01522  
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Currently, the method of paying physicians for their services remains complex and is a matter 
of ongoing discussion [4]. The selection of a specific payment method for physicians has a 
significant impact on recruitment and retention of medical doctors in rural and isolated regions 
[5], as well as on the quantity [5-9] and quality of health services [5, 10, 11]. Specific payment 
methods are subjects of discussion due to their influence in the fragmentation [10] and costs of 
health care systems [10, 12, 13]. 
Among privately and publically financed health care models, third parties are included in the 
physician-patient relationship [3, 14]. Intermediaries involved in the provision of care affect the 
physician-patient relationship [15]. The issue of how a given health care system obtains funds to 
finance costs of health services must be differentiated from the payment method used to pay 
services provided by physicians [4]. Health care systems finance provision of care through out-
of-pocket, individual private insurance, employment-based group insurance, or government 
financing; while the payment method refers to how health care providers are paid for their 
services [4, 14]. Decisions and actions of third parties could generate potential threats for the 
professional autonomy of physicians. Autonomy is one of the higher-order needs, as described 
by Abraham Maslow in his theory of motivation [16]. Indeed, autonomy has been established as 
a critical motivating and wellness factor for physicians [17-23]. An erosion of physicians’ 
autonomy can deteriorate their wellness [17-23], which could affect quality of care [19, 24, 25].  
Health care systems have not focused on understanding, evaluating, and improving wellness 
of health care professionals [19] despite the importance of this issue for the quality of health care 
[19, 26, 27]. Compared with non-health care professions and the general population, physicians 
are at higher risk of burnout [19, 28]. Studies have identified and discussed factors affecting the 
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wellness of physicians [19-21, 29-39]; however, there is a lack of studies measuring the 
influence that different payment methods could have on the wellness of physicians. 
1.1. Payment Methods for Practicing Medicine  
“That any sane nation, having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread 
by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking for you, should go on to give a surgeon 
a pecuniary interest in cutting off your leg, is enough to make one despair of political 
humanity. But that is precisely what we have done.”  
George Bernard Shaw2 
The way physicians are paid for the provision of care is a relevant aspect of health care 
systems and health services organization. Several methods for paying physicians are available 
which involve different values or attributes of health services, such as freedom, quality, quantity, 
and costs, among others [4].  
Before going further in this subject, a clarification between “payment” and “reimbursement” 
is necessary [40]. On the one hand, payment refers to what a health care provider gets, basically 
“what one gets when cashing a paycheck” [40, p87] (e.g., one medical procedure might be paid 
differently by a government than a private payer, or two physicians with the same level of 
training and experience could receive different payments for the same service). On the other 
hand, reimbursement is a term which refers to a compensation of the actual cost/money which 
has already been used (e.g., an insurance company reimbursing a person for the costs incurred in 
medical care, or an employee being reimbursed for out-of-pocket travel costs) [40]. The topic 
under discussion in this dissertation is “payment” and not “reimbursement.” 
Two classification models will be employed to understand differences and critical 
characteristics of payment methods. One model classifies methods according to units of payment 
                                                 
2 Preface on Doctors in the Doctor's Dilemma, 1909. Reprinted in International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 2003;32(6):910-5. Available at: http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/32/6/910.full  
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[5, 14, 41] and another considers time and variability as dimensions of payment arrangements 
[41].  
Payment methods for physicians could be placed in a continuum according to the aggregated 
level, going from the least (one payment per one service) to the most aggregated level (one 
payment for a variety of services) [14]. At the same time, each payment method uses different 
units of aggregation [14, 41] (Figure 1-1).   
 
Figure 1-1.  Continuum of payment methods for physicians by unit of payment; modified from  
Bodenheimer and Grumbach [14, p32] 
At one end, the unit of fee-for-service (FFS) is item-of-service (e.g., visit or procedure); while 
at the other end, capitation and salary systems use, as units of payments, patients and time, 
respectively [14, 41]. Episode payments group procedures according to an episode (practitioners 
are paid for all procedures carried out related to a given illness episode like an appendectomy, 
cholecystectomy, etc.) [14], whereas sessional and salary payments aggregate units of time 
(physicians are paid for a given period of time like weeks, months, etc.). As a result, the 
continuum of payment methods for physicians goes from FFS to salary systems [5, 14, 41].  
The model described by Jegers et al. [41] can be used to understand other characteristics of 
payment methods. This model considers two components in a Cartesian plane: 
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retrospective/prospective systems in the X axis and variable/fixed systems in the Y axis (Figure 
1-2).  
 
Figure 1-2.  Classification of payment methods based on retrospective/prospective and 
variable/fixed dimensions; modified from Jegers et al. [41, p263]  
The first dimension is based on the relation between a physician’s income and her/his costs 
for providing care. A payment method is “retrospective” when payments are done ex post; a 
physician is paid after a service has been provided, covering actual expenses and giving little 
motivation to reduce costs [41].  A payment is “prospective” when payments or budgets are 
determined ex ante; payments do not have a direct link to the real costs of the individual 
provider.  Prospective payments are systems that stimulate more efficiency in comparison to 
retrospective models [41]. 
The variability dimension is based on the relationship between activities and payment. A 
payment is “fixed” when the amount paid does not vary, despite a high or low volume of 
activities done. In contrast, a payment is “variable’ when payment varies according to changes in 
volume of activities [41]. 
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1.1.1. Fee-For-Service 
In Canada and the United States of America, the conventional method to pay physicians for 
their services has been FFS [13, 42, 43]. This method provides one payment per each service, 
procedure, or visit [14, 41]. The prices of medical activities (diagnostic and therapeutic ones) are 
known ex ante, like in the Belgian or German systems which have regulated an extensive list of 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions [41]. In Canada, the list of fees that physicians can bill 
to the ministry of health is annually negotiated between provincial medical associations and 
provincial governments. These negotiations on fee schedules have been focused on percentages 
of increase and the size of the total budget for physician services [44].  
The FFS system provides a variable income for physicians according to the type and quantity 
of services provided, offering a strong incentive to increase production [41]. If a physician 
provides more services, he/she will perceive a higher income [14, 41]. The FFS system was 
historically preferred by medical practitioners as they could exert price discrimination, having 
the freewill to charge patients; today, physicians perceive that with FFS they could keep 
autonomy and protect themselves from potential governmental cost controls which could impact 
their income [44].  
Nevertheless, as Emery et al. [44, p6] argue, the FFS system is known “to be far from the 
socially efficient payment arrangement.” This payment system has been blamed for being a 
factor contributing to the fragmentation of health care [10], numerous and shorter physician-
patient visits, poor quality of care [10, 11], lower satisfaction among physicians [11], and rising 
costs of health care systems [10, 12, 13].  
In Canada, expenditure of physicians is the third largest component of total health care 
spending [12, 42]. In 2012-2013, the total public-sector expenditure for physicians was 22.83 
billion and FFS accounted for 70.7% of it [45]. Additionally, physician spending was identified 
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as the fastest-growing health category between 1998 and 2008 (6.5% average annual growth), 
and the key cost driver of physicians spending was FFS schedules increases (3.6% of the 6.5%) 
[12]. In fact, FFS schedules increased faster than other goods and services and grew faster than 
the average weekly wages of other health and social services workers [12]. Therefore, there is a 
need to move from a volume-based payment model to alternative payment methods [46, 47]. 
1.1.2. Alternative Payment Plans 
Since the introduction of Medicare in Canada, physicians have been traditionally paid by FFS 
schemes [42, 43]; however, since the 1990s provincial/territorial governments have been 
implementing different forms of alternative payment plans (APP), also known as alternative 
funding plans [42, 45, 48].  
APP are arrangements to pay physicians by other methods than FFS [45, 48] which use 
diverse units of aggregation (Figure 1-1) [14] and have different levels of variability (Figure 1-2) 
[41]. According to the National Physician Data Base of the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, APP increased from 10.6% in 2000 to 29.3% in 2013 of the total payment for 
physicians in Canada [45]; see Figure 1-3. Since 2000, similar growing tendencies of APP have 
been observed across Canadian provinces. In 2013, the percentages of APP ranged from 14% (in 
Alberta) to 47.9% (in Nova Scotia) of total payments to physicians [45]. From the lowest to 
highest degree of aggregation and from variable to fixed payments, the continuum of APP for 
physicians includes episode payments, capitation, sessional contracts, and salaries. 
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Figure 1-3.  Fee-for-service (FFS) and alternative payment plans (APP) proportions of the total 
payments to physicians from 2000 to 2013. Figure based on National Physician Database, 2012-
2013 Data Release [45]. 
1.1.2.1. Episode payments 
Payment by episodes group several services under one payment, such as activities related to 
one case or episode [14, 49]. To define an episode of care, two dimensions need to be 
considered. The first dimension refers to the clinical condition or procedure; the second is the 
time dimension which defines when an episode begins and ends [49]. For example, an insurance 
company or government could pay a surgeon for a laparoscopic cholecystectomy, including 
related pre- and post-operative care [14].  
Paying physicians by episode-based methods has been recommended since it could be an 
incentive to improve efficiency and coordination of care [49]. This payment method can 
encourage services that have a long waiting time (elective surgeries) and also reduce the number 
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of post-operative visits [14, 49].  
Furthermore, episode-based payments transfer to the health services provider part of the 
financial risk (defined as the “potential to lose money, earn less money, or spend more time 
without additional payment” [14, p34]) while in capitation schemes the risk transfer is higher 
[14]. 
1.1.2.2. Capitation 
The unit of payment in capitation is the patient, known as per capita payments. Physicians 
receive an agreed amount of money for a period of time (e.g. annual payment) for each enrolled 
patient [14]. Capitation is prospective given that payment for each patient per a given period of 
time is established ex ante [41]. The total payment that a physician receives is the per capita 
amount times the total number of patients enrolled, independently of the number of visits and 
services required by patients on the list [41]. 
Practitioners paid by capitation are motivated to maximize resources because income per 
capita will be the same despite the amount of services provided; capitation system transfers the 
financial risk from insurers to providers [14]. This commonly known non-FFS payment system 
[42] offers the potential to control expenditure and promote coordination of care [14]. The 
capitation system has a variant called risk-adjusted capitation which considers an extra per 
capita compensation for patients with complex conditions; e.g., elderly patients and those with 
chronic diseases [14]. 
1.1.2.3. Sessional payments 
Sessional arrangements are payments based on short periods of time (e.g. hourly, daily, etc.) 
between physicians and agencies [45]. For instance, locum tenens is a temporal arrangement with 
a physician to assume the duties of another physician on a temporary basis [50]. Locum tenentes 
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are work opportunities for young physicians to acquire experience and alternatives for systems to 
cover staff shortages [50-52]; however, these temporal arrangements are seen as a threat to 
quality and continuity of care [53]. This type of payment might be considered a variant of salary 
systems. 
1.1.2.4. Salary 
Salary pays for a complete range of medical care delivered during a period of time (i.e., 
month or year) [14]. Payment by salary is one of the most common APP [42], situated at the 
most aggregated and fixed end of the payment models [5, 14, 41]. Physicians could be paid on a 
salaried basis directly by an insurance company, government, regional authority, or hospital. 
Medical practitioners on salary could be also paid by medical groups which could be paid, at the 
same time, by different payment models. This APP could include salary-plus-bonus 
arrangements, something commonly seen among medical groups [14].  
Salary arrangements have strong incentives to reduce marginal costs (e.g., reducing number of 
visits) [41], are capable of ensuring services of physicians in isolated/underserved areas [5], and 
have the capacity to attract and secure services that could have a small demand which cannot be 
financed by FFS (e.g., pediatric neurosurgery, neuro-ophthalmology, pediatric gastroenterology, 
etc.). Salaries also have been used to involve physicians in academic, research, and 
administrative positions [14]. Notwithstanding, this payment model does not provide financial 
incentives for working extra hours, seeing a high volume of complex patients, or for increasing 
quantity of services provided [14]. 
The financial risk leans on the insurance agent or practice group which employs the 
physicians on salary. This risk is managed through constraint policies (more patients and shorter 
visits, and also by limiting the number of available physicians) [14]; these kinds of strategies 
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affect autonomy and motivation of medical practitioners [17-23]. Given that patients could 
receive less care, salary payments could also potentially affect quality of care [41].   
1.1.3. Blended arrangements 
Other option to pay physicians could be a mixture of different methods. Practitioners paid by 
salary or capitation could also have the possibility to bill certain services through FFS to increase 
volume of services provided [42]. For example, a family medicine professor may have a salary 
for clinical practice and in his contract this physician could be allowed to bill certain medical 
services, such as for Pap smears, hypercholesterolemia screening, etc.  
This common practice of combining FFS and APP usually has great variability in the 
proportion paid by one or the other method, showing an enormous range of possibilities.  Thus, 
blended payments could be considered an option in the middle of the road within models of 
payment methods; variability and aggregation levels will depend on the proportions of APP and 
FFS offered in payment agreements. 
1.1.4. Controversies in Payment Methods 
Despite the growing trend of APP across Canadian provinces [42, 45, 48], there are 
discussions about the impact of new payment models on the productivity of physicians and 
delivery of health services [5-9]. 
On the one hand, studies have demonstrated that physicians paid by APP have a lower 
productivity than those paid by FFS [5-9]. Working hours of family practitioners (FPs) paid by 
salary and blended schemes are 40.46% and 23.13% less, respectively, than practitioners paid by 
FFS [9]. Also, FPs paid by salary and blended methods see fewer patients per week (between 
20% and 58% fewer) [7] and dedicate between 37% and 44% less time to direct patient care in 
the office/clinic [7, 8] than those paid by FFS. 
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On the other hand, Sarma et al. [8] identified that FPs paid by APP and blended methods 
dedicate more time to different forms of care. In comparison to physicians paid by FFS, FPs with 
APP and blended methods invest respectively 61% and 54% more time on direct patient care in 
settings other than the office/clinic, and also two thirds more time on indirect patient care [8]. In 
a systematic literature review, Gosden et al. [6] recognized that patients of physicians paid by 
salary reported higher access satisfaction in comparison to patients of practitioners paid by FFS. 
APP and blended methods are options to promote effective models of care [8]. APP and 
blended schemes could act as an incentive for physicians in the co-ordination of care, 
administration, research, continuing medical education, and interprofessional care [8]. APP could 
improve the duration and quality of time devoted to patient care [54, 55], while FFS rewards 
productivity [54, 44] and incentive physicians to adopt a high workloads [44]. 
As Elit and Cosby argue [55], payment system shifts are a “philosophical change” that could 
impact perceptions and behaviors of physicians, affecting their clinical and personal priorities. 
Wranik and Durier-Copp [5] conceptualized the link among the payment methods, behavior of 
physicians, and health care outcomes. In their conceptual logic model, the internal (health care 
policies) and external (population health) contexts are considered, highlighting the fact that the 
effect of payment methods is context-dependent. They described that behavior of physicians and 
health care outputs are influenced by payment arrangement (FFS, salary, capitation, blended 
arrangements, etc.) and non-financial incentives (organizational structure, housing arrangements, 
professional opportunities, leaves agreements, rotation schedules, etc.). Thus, behavior of 
physicians and health care outputs impact on patient health outcomes. The latter is also affected 
by adherence of patients and clinical effectiveness [5]. 
 13 
Physicians are influenced by the method with which they are paid, modifying their behavior, 
outputs and outcomes [5]. For example, payments with high variability could motivate 
physicians to provide high quantities of care, accept more patients, and invest in the satisfaction 
of their patients while fixed payment models promote health prevention and promotion activities, 
and collaborative care [5]. It is proposed in this dissertation that payment methods, along with 
non-financial factors, affect perceptions of professional equity and distress of physicians (Figure 
1-4). These wellness indicators are also influenced by other personal factors, such as gender, age, 
and specialty. The close relationship of career satisfaction with these two daily perceptions of 
physicians needs to be considered, as well as the working conditions of medical practitioners 
(solo or group practice, large or small hospital/medical centre, workload, patients with complex 
conditions, availability to other health care professionals, access to diagnostic and treatment 
resources, academic and administrative duties, etc.).  
Working conditions are closely connected with non-financial incentives; at the same time, 
payment methods are linked with non-financial incentives and working conditions. Then, 
payment methods, non-financial factors, and working conditions have an impact on daily 
perceptions of physicians (professional equity and distress). Perceptions of physicians indicate 
their level of motivation and can shape their behavior, influencing health care outputs and 
affecting health outcomes; see Figure 1-4. 
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Figure 1-4.  Logic model of the influence of payment methods for practicing medicine on 
behavior of physicians, outputs, and outcomes; modified from Wranik and Durier-Copp [5, p37]. 
Given that attitudes influence decisions and guide behavior, health care managers need to 
understand how a person sees the world to facilitate motivation and productivity [56]; thus, 
attitudes, beliefs, and motivation of physicians need to be understood.  However, there is a lack 
of evidence about the impact of payment methods on perceptions of physicians, specifically 
about their wellness. Some studies have explored the effect of payment methods on perceived 
professional equity [57] and work stress [31, 58, 59] by physicians; indeed, disagreement can be 
observed among studies comparing stress of physicians by the payment method. In the 
implementation of payment policies, efforts have been focused on productivity measurements, 
neglecting an evaluation of wellness of medical practitioners. 
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1.2. Wellness of Physicians 
 “We are really proposing a paradigm shift and suggesting that physician wellness is 
also an important and necessary indicator of health care systems quality.”  
Jean E. Wallace3 
Wellness is a holistic concept understood as a dynamic and ongoing process of a quest for 
optimal human functioning [60, 61], involving physical, mental, and emotional health and well-
being [19, 60]. Physicians face physical (long work hours, workload, fatigue, unhealthy 
lifestyles, etc.), mental (leadership in a challenging environment, lack of sleep, stress, anxiety, 
depression, burn-out, substance abuse, etc.), social (lack of free time, other pursuits, time off 
from work, etc.), and intellectual (information overload, unfinished work, lack of mentorship, 
lack of time to innovate and update skills and knowledge, etc.) challenges in their professional 
practice [19, 62]. Evidence demonstrates that wellness of physicians is suboptimal, being a 
problem that requires further comprehension and attention [19-21, 29-32, 34, 35, 39].  
Given that wellness of physicians is associated with the quality of health care provided [26, 
27, 39], poor wellness is not only relevant for medical doctors but also for patients and health 
care systems [19]. Unfortunately, wellness of medical practitioners is “a missing indicator” in 
health care [19] and there is a poor awareness of the existence of a link between physicians’ 
wellness and quality of patient care [27]. 
Wellness of physicians includes “being challenged, thriving and achieving success in various 
aspects of personal and professional life” [63, p514]. Physicians need to feel engaged, 
empowered, confident (in self, colleagues, and the organization), and have a self-awareness to 
develop and maintain wellness [60]. The absence of high levels of distress and optimal levels of 
motivation are important components of their wellness [19, 63]. This dissertation explores 
                                                 
3 Interview in the Lancet, November 13, 2009. Available at: 
http://podcast.thelancet.com/audio/lancet/2009/9702_14november.mp3   
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professional equity as a measure of motivation, and distress experienced by physicians in their 
daily practice.       
1.2.1. Professional equity 
Motivation (from the Latin root movere “movement”) refers to reasons that a person has for 
doing/achieving something [64] and can be defined as the psychological process of “conscious or 
unconscious stimulus, incentive, or motives for action toward a goal resulting from 
psychological or social factors, the factors giving the purpose or direction to behavior” [56, 
p105]. In the organizational context, motivation is a transactional process between an individual 
and her/his work environment where unsatisfied needs want to be satisfied. This process results 
in a direction, effort and persistence of individuals toward goals [56, 64, 65]. The art of 
motivating relies on the recognition of people’s needs [66]. Health care managers should practice 
this art, promoting self-motivation and an organizational environment that increases the 
willingness of individuals to apply and maintain effort towards established organizational goals 
[56, 66]. 
Different theories have been developed to understand motivation and are grouped in content 
(needs) and process (cognitive) theories [56, 64]. The first group focuses on factors that drive 
people to satisfy needs, “what drives behavior?” [56, p106]; the second group focuses on 
cognitive processes of motivation , “how behavior is energized, directed, sustained, and stopped” 
[56, p106]. The Maslow’s hierarchy of needs [16] is a well-known example of a content theory 
which describes that individuals have five levels of needs to be satisfied; higher-needs want to be 
satisfied once lower-needs are satisfied  [16, 56, 64]. As an example of a process motivation 
theory, the Adams’ professional equity theory considers that an equitable provision of rewards 
promotes better motivation [56, 64].  
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Career satisfaction applies the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory. The evaluation of 
satisfaction with the career is a long term perception based on evaluation of needs [35]. In 
contrast, professional equity is a short term perception, almost a daily evaluation, which could be 
affected by every-day aspects of work. Evaluating professional equity allows the understanding 
of the effect that intrinsic and extrinsic rewards have on the motivation of medical practitioners 
[67]. Consequently, both measures of motivation of physicians, career satisfaction and 
professional equity, are going to be studied in this dissertation. 
Special attention will be given to professional equity, since it is a perception that could be 
directly affected by payment methods for practicing medicine. The equity theory basically 
considers the relationship between an individual’s contributions to the organization (inputs) and 
rewards that a person receives in return (outputs), motivating individuals to adjust inputs/outputs 
imbalances [56, 64, 68, 69]. Inputs refer to those factors that a person provides to her/his work 
(education, experience, skills, abilities, effort, etc.); outputs include all rewards that individuals 
receive, both intrinsic and extrinsic ones [56, 64, 68]. Extrinsic rewards are tangible or intangible 
factors like payments, incentives, bonuses, benefits, recognitions, promotions, etc. Intrinsic 
factors come from the work itself; these are rewards that engage a person such as autonomy, 
interesting and challenging duties, achievement, etc. [56, 64, 69]. 
Motivation of physicians is complex because extrinsic and intrinsic factors affect their 
motivation [69]; however, extrinsic factors like financial incentives (i.e., pay-per-performance 
incentives) have demonstrated a limited effect on their behavior [70] and a potential to increase 
the physicians’ perception of burden [33]. Among physicians, intrinsic rewards are a critical 
source of motivation, such as interacting with patients [54, 71, 72] and having professional 
achievement [73] and autonomy [17-23]. These are noteworthy reasons to apply the professional 
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equity theory.  
As J. Stacy Adams explains [68], individuals evaluate their own ratio of inputs and outputs 
with the ratios of “referent others” in the same or a different organization. An inputs/outputs 
imbalance generates tension in an individual and leads to professional inequity. Different 
mechanisms could be employed by a person to resolve professional inequities. Individuals could 
modify their inputs (reduce productivity, take longer breaks, etc.) and/or outputs (seek for a 
payment increase) to restore professional equity [56, 68]. The strength of motivation to reduce 
inequities is proportional to perceived inequity [56]. Interestingly, inputs adjustment in the 
presence of inequities vary according to the payment method that a person receives [68]. 
Moreover, subjective changes could restore a perception of professional equity, adjusting self or 
others’ inputs/outputs. Individuals could also be motivated to change the “reference other” or just 
leave the organization or field [56].  
Payment methods play a critical role in the perception of professional equity because they will 
determine financial rewards, as well as other type of rewards like recognition of efforts. For 
instance, FFS is a volume payment method, basically rewarding more for a greater number of 
cases [10, 11, 14, 41]. In contrast, salary might provide recognition of training, experience and/or 
seniority, offering high revenues, extra time off, continued medical education, support for 
teaching and research duties, etc.  
Among physicians, studies have traditionally evaluated motivation applying the satisfaction 
perspective based on fulfillment of their needs [35-37, 74]. Some studies have explored 
professional equity [57, 67]; indeed, a specific questionnaire for physicians has been developed 
and tested across Canadian provinces by Dobson et al. [67]. This instrument has three 
dimensions (financial, fulfillment, and recognition rewards).  
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In the presence of persistent professional inequities, individuals experience distress in their 
efforts to restore equity which might lead to negative consequences [56]. An undercompensated 
person could reduce inputs (productivity, time of work, quality, etc.) or even leave the field 
(hospital/clinic, region, or the medical practice per se) when an individual perceives that 
inequities are considerable [56]. Additionally, high levels of stress could trigger latent 
professional inequities and increase the probability of burnout among physicians.  
1.2.2. Daily distress 
Given that a similar work situation could have two different assessments of demands and 
resources, stress is a complex and personalized process of an individual interacting with the work 
environment [56]. Work-related stress is common but it is often considered as a negative aspect; 
however, there are positive stressors [56] and adequate levels of stress could have beneficial 
effects [56, 75, 76]. Indeed, if physicians have abilities to cope with daily tensions, the stress of 
medical practice could potentially improve the quality of medical care; although, vulnerable 
practitioners would be unable to practice or might result in serious mental/physical illnesses [71]. 
Considering that the health of workers is a complete continuum of mental and physical health, 
Beehr and Newman [76, p670] defined stress at work as “a situation wherein job-related factors 
interact with a worker to change (i.e., disrupt or enhance) his or her psychological and/or 
physiological condition such that the person (i.e., mind-body) is forced to deviate from normal 
functioning.” Randall S. Schuler [75, p189] added that stress at the work environment “is a 
dynamic condition in which an individual is confronted (with an opportunity / constrain / 
demand) for being / having / doing what she/he desires and for which the resolution of is 
perceived to have uncertainty but which will lead to important outcomes”, including positive and 
negative ones.  
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The concept of stress experienced at work needs to be differentiated from burnout, which is a 
negative outcome to stress exposure. Burnout has been defined as “a psychological syndrome in 
response to chronic interpersonal stressors on the job” [77, p399] and is characterized by 
exhaustion (stress dimension, being depleted of emotional and physical resources), 
depersonalization (interpersonal context dimension, detachment from the job), and inefficacy 
(self-evaluation dimension, lack of accomplishment at work) [77]. Burnout is more prevalent 
among physicians and they are at higher risk of burnout compared to other workers [19, 28]; 
indeed, physicians at the front line of health care are at a high risk of burnout [28]. 
Notwithstanding, this dissertation is centered on a wider scope of stress, the daily stress 
experienced by physicians in their practice. This broader approach of the stress of physicians 
yields to the differentiation between lower to severe levels of stress in the daily practice of 
medicine, identifying fatigued medical practitioners from those at risk of burnout [30]. An 
instrument has been developed by Lepnurm et al.[30] to evaluate daily distress of physicians. 
This questionnaire has been tested with a national sample of physicians practicing in Canada. 
Physicians face inherent distresses to medical practice, working in emotionally-charged 
circumstances and managing complex interactions with patients, families and other health 
professionals [19, 71]. Jack D. McCue [71, p458-9] states that stresses of medical practice result 
from “working with intensely emotional aspects of life governed by strong cultural 
codes…inadequate training for fundamental professional tasks…the need for certainty when 
current medical knowledge allows only approximation.” This author claims that training is 
critical for physicians to handle intensely emotional and sensitive dimensions of life in daily 
medical practice, such as suffering (understanding and managing sickness and pain), fear 
(primary reason of patients for consulting), sexuality (access to private aspects of individuals), 
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and death (usually seen as a failure of care) [71]. These inherent tensions of medical practice 
could be experienced more within certain medical specialties [28, 30]; higher levels of daily 
distress have been documented among physicians of intensive care units, emergency and 
operating rooms [30], as well as among physicians at the front line of care [28, 30].  
In addition to the inherent distresses of medical practice, other stressors need to be 
recognized. Workload increases, organizational changes, practice restrictions, lack of 
professional autonomy, and career dissatisfaction are added sources of stress documented among 
physicians [19-21, 23, 24, 29]. Heavy workloads are directly associated with physicians’ stress, 
turnover, satisfaction, and also with patient care quality [24]. Medical practitioners tend to work 
more than 50 hours per week [24], despite medical errors being more likely when physicians 
experience physical and mental exhaustion [78]. Medical practitioners also need to skillfully 
manage limited health care resources, complex and growing needs of patients, and rising public 
expectations, while perceiving a lack of support to achieve these demands [79, 80].  
Furthermore, health care systems changes and management adjustments are extra sources of 
daily distress. Strategies of governments and health insurances companies to control health care 
costs are threatening quality of care and wellness of physicians [19, 80]. Shifts in payment 
methods for practicing medicine are changes that have been pointed to as an extra source of 
stress for physicians [23, 24, 58, 59]. As Williams et al. [24] suggest, physicians paid by FFS 
tend to adopt a high workload to secure a certain income; therefore, becoming exposed to high 
levels of stress. Notwithstanding, evidence of payment methods as a factor that affects stress of 
physicians is inconclusive. Changes in the payment method have been associated with increased 
stress experienced by physicians [59] and less stress could be observed among salaried 
physicians [58]. In contrast, a study among family physicians practicing in Ontario, Canada, 
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found that stress was not affected by payment method [31]; however, this study did not consider 
controlling variables in the analysis. Consequently, the effect of payment methods on stress of 
physicians needs to be studied, acknowledging demographic, workload, and organizational 
factors which have been already related to their work stress.  
1.2.3. Gender Inequalities 
Gender is a critical factor that must be considered in the evaluation of the wellness of 
physicians given that the proportion of women in medicine is growing [7, 19, 63] and because 
there are differences in the wellness of female and male physicians [19, 63].  
The medical workforce is rapidly changing its demographic distribution and women 
physicians are no longer a minority [7, 19, 63, 81, 82]. Many years ago, medical training was a 
proscribed field for women and they experienced discrimination, despite their roles in health care 
which have been always present throughout history [83, 84]. After decades of struggle, women 
were accepted in medical schools and they have provided innumerable important legacies in 
medicine [84]. Several authors state that the number of female physicians will exceed the 
number of male physicians in the near future [7, 19, 63, 81]. In fact, in the United Kingdom, the 
proportion of female general practitioners has already surpassed the number of males; also, the 
proportion of chief executive women in the National Health System is higher than other areas 
like politics and business [82]. In Canada, the proportion of female physicians has grown from 
less than 10% in the 60s [8, 85] to 38.2% in 2013 [86]. This growing participation of women in 
the practice of medicine is a reminder to include the gender perspective in the study of wellness 
of physicians. 
In addition to the inherent distresses of medical practice [71] and the fact that women 
physicians earn less in comparison to male physicians [87, 88], female physicians experience 
extra stressors and “often face greater challenges than do male physicians” [19, p1716]. In their 
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medical careers, many women experience extra stressors, such as discrimination, role strain, and 
lack of role models and support [89]. Studies report that female physicians experience less 
control over their workload [88, 90] and that they are at a higher risk of burnout [91].  
Gender discrimination is a critical issue that female physicians could face, especially where 
they are still a minority [89]. After women overcame the discrimination in place for hundreds of 
years to become medical doctors [84], female physicians are still a minority in relation to male 
colleagues among certain specialties [86, 89, 92]. According to the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, surgical specialties have the lowest proportions of women (urology, 7.8%; 
orthopedic, 9.8%; cardiac surgery, 10%; neurosurgery, 10.6%; otolaryngology, 16.5%; plastic 
surgery, 18.9; general surgery, 20%), whereas the highest proportion of female physicians is 
observed in family medicine (42.4%) [92]. The “attitude that women cannot do surgery is still 
held by many senior surgeons” [89, p181], making worse the discrimination faced among female 
physicians that have chosen surgery for their careers.  
Female doctors in medical faculty and leadership positions is also growing but is still under-
represented [89]. Indeed, it has been reported that women in medical faculty positions experience 
discrimination to access work resources and access career opportunities [93]. Moreover, the 
proportion of female physicians notably varies across provinces; Prince Edward Island and 
Saskatchewan have the lowest proportion of female physicians, 29.1% and 32.7% respectively, 
while 43% of physicians are women in Quebec [92].   
Among the new generation of physicians, under-representation and discrimination could be 
less common concerns [89]. Although creating and maintaining a balance between work and 
personal spheres is a significant issue in medicine, this is more challenging for some female 
physicians [19, 32, 89, 93]. Indeed, Wallace et al. [72] identified that female physicians who are 
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mothers face more work-to-family conflicts than male physicians who are fathers or than 
physicians who are not parents.  
Other important gender differences that might impact wellness of physicians have been 
documented in relation to income and payment methods. A study across specialties in the United 
States demonstrated that, in addition to the income differences by specialties, female physicians 
earn less in comparison to male physicians [87]. This income difference can definitely impact the 
perception of professional equity, as well as daily distress experienced by female doctors. 
Moreover, a study among three Canadian provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince 
Edward Island, and New Brunswick) identified that more than half of females physicians are 
paid by APP, especially among those in younger groups [48]. The number of physicians paid by 
alternative payment systems has been increasing during the last thirteen years across the 
Canadian provinces, although Ontario and Saskatchewan have shown the most remarkable 
percentage increases. In Saskatchewan, the proportion of physicians paid by APP has grown 
from 8% in 2000 to 34.7% in 2013 [45]. These trends highlight the need to continue evaluating 
the impact of APP.  
1.3. Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this dissertation was to explore the effects of APP on physicians’ perceptions of 
professional equity and daily distress. A cross-sectional study was designed and conducted 
among physicians practicing in the Saskatoon Health Region (SHR), Saskatchewan. The SHR is 
the largest health authority in the province and provides health care to about a third of the 
population of Saskatchewan among 75 health care facilities, including 10 hospitals and 30 long 
term care facilities [94]. A sample of the study questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. The 
following questions guided this research: 
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1. Does professional equity perceived by physicians vary among practitioners paid by 
FFS, APP, or blended alternatives? 
Hypothesis: Physicians paid by APP perceive different levels of professional equity 
than those paid by FFS, and that the effect of payment method on the levels of 
professional equity varies according to specialty and workload. 
2. Is the payment method associated with daily distress of medical practitioners? 
Hypothesis: Perceived levels of distress among physicians is associated with 
payment methods (APP, FFS, or blended schemes),considering workload, working 
hours, proportion of complex cases, time devoted to academic and administrative 
tasks, and career satisfaction of practitioners. 
3. Are levels of professional equity, daily distress, and career satisfaction of physicians 
different by gender and payment methods? 
Hypothesis: Professional equity, daily distress, and career satisfaction vary by gender 
and payment method, and also that payment methods and gender have an interaction 
effect on these wellness indicators of physicians. 
This dissertation has been organized in an article-based format. Three published articles 
address each of the research questions stated above.  
Article one (Chapter 2) explores the effect of payment methods on professional equity 
perceived by physicians, using the three dimensional questionnaire developed by Dobson et 
al.[67]. Levels of professional equity were compared by payment method in unconditional and 
conditional analyses. Also, levels of fulfillment, income, and recognition equity were compared 
among physicians paid by APP, FFS, and blended schemes. 
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 Article two (Chapter 3) examines the role of payment methods on daily distress of 
physicians. Levels of daily distress experienced by physicians were measured with the 
questionnaire of Lepnurm et al.[30]. A two-level regression model was used to test the effect of 
payment methods on distress. The multilevel model accounted for environmental factors where 
physicians practice (random component) and for individual factors associated with levels of 
distress that physicians experience (fixed component).  
Article three (Chapter 4) analyzes disparities in professional equity, distress, and career 
satisfaction of physicians by gender and payment method. Differences among these indicators of 
wellness by gender and payment were concurrently evaluated and an interaction effect between 
these two factors was tested. 
Ethics approval from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board, University of Saskatchewan, was 
obtained to conduct this research (Appendix B), as well as Operational Approval from the SHR 
(Appendix C).  
Each of the articles describes in detail the methodology and characteristics of the sample. 
Some repetition might be observed among chapters. The permission to reprint the articles 
published in the Journal of Hospital Administration is available in Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER 2† 
ARTICLE ONE: IMPACT OF PAYMENT METHODS ON PROFESSIONAL EQUITY 
OF PHYSICIANS 
† This chapter examines professional equity and payment methods for physicians. The purpose of 
Chapter 2 is to compare levels of professional equity among payment methods. The contents of 
Chapter 2 have been published as: Peña-Sánchez JN, Lepnurm R, Dobson RT, Keegan D. Impact 
of payment methods on professional equity of physicians. Journal of Hospital Administration. 
2013;3:50-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jha.v3n2p50 
2.1. Background 
Motivation is the psychological process of “conscious or unconscious stimulus, incentives, or 
motives for action toward a goal” [1, p105]. Health care professionals are motivated by both 
extrinsic and intrinsic factors [2]. Physicians do not automatically respond to financial incentive 
schemes [3]–an extrinsic factor–as they are influenced considerably more by intrinsic factors of 
medical practice, such as interaction with patients [4], professional autonomy [5] and 
achievement [6]. Consequently, complex motivational sources among physicians need to be 
understood. The use of professional equity theory could facilitate understanding of perceived 
fairness between efforts and rewards in the practice of medicine. 
Professional equity theory [7] argues that individuals evaluate their own contributions (inputs) 
and rewards received (outputs) compared to the inputs and outputs of “referent others” within the 
same organization or in other organizations with similar conditions. A perception of imbalance 
between contributions and rewards leads to professional inequity and tension within a person, 
who is then likely to be motivated to adjust imbalaknces [1]. An individual will attempt to 
restore a state of professional equity when her/his rate of inputs and outputs becomes the same as 
the rates of others [7]. This scenario underlines the relevance of payment methods on 
professional equity; however, this perception has not been assessed according to payment 
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methods among physicians. In a continuum of payment methods according to units of 
aggregation, fee-for-service (FFS) represents the least aggregated end, where a payment is made 
per each service, procedure, or visit; while, salary represents the most aggregated end, paying per 
time for a complete range of medical services to patients. Also, capitation is a well-known 
intermediate payment example, where periodic payments are made per patient for a broad range 
of health services [8]. Alternative payment plans (APP)–such as salary, capitation, among 
others–represent varying degrees of aggregation. Since the satisfaction of different medical 
specialists has been associated with patient interactions, payment methods that encourage 
duration and quality of time in the provision of patient care are recommended instead of FFS 
schemes [4]. 
Traditionally, physicians in North America have been paid by FFS for the provision of care; 
however, concerns about the negative effects on the health care system and its providers have 
been raised. In the United States (US), FFS has been considered as a contributory factor to the 
fragmentation of health care among Medicare beneficiaries, as well as to the high cost and the 
poor quality of health care [9]. There is a call for a transition from this volume-based payment 
method, FFS, to value driven payment alternatives to support innovative health care delivery 
models [10]. Indeed, the US Affordable Care Act includes models of health care intending to 
move from FFS payment of physicians to alternative or blended methods [11]. In Canada, FFS 
has been recognized as an important factor in increasing health care cost, accounting for more 
than half of the average annual growth in physician spending between 1998 and 2008 [12]. 
During the last two decades APP have been implemented across Canada [13, 14]; as a result, 
APP represented a quarter of the total payment for physicians by 2010 [13]. 
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Family physicians paid by APP have been found to see fewer patients but devote more time to 
direct patient care outside the office and to indirect patient care [15, 16]. Also, given that lower 
levels of satisfaction [17, 18] and income disparities [19] have been described among 
family/general practitioners (FPs) in comparison with other specialists, it is pertinent to evaluate 
differences in the perceptions of professional equity among physicians, comparing FPs and other 
specialists paid by different payment schemes. 
FPs play a fundamental role in health care systems, and adequate levels of professional equity 
among them are critical. Since physicians are called to understand the patient and her/his context 
in order to adequately treat a person with a disease [20], models ensuring a continuum of care 
will facilitate physicians to have a comprehensive knowledge about their patients. Models of care 
that reduce the gap between primary and hospital care need to be explored. For instance, a 
triangular model with FPs as health care leaders has been developed in Castelfiorentino 
(Tuscany, Italy) [21] where hospitalists and primary care physicians are coordinated in a patient-
centered care model, supported by an academic physician who acts as facilitator and educator. 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) in the US provide another example of a patient-
centered care model. The ACOs are integrated networks of physicians assuming the 
responsibility for providing care to a defined patient population, where rewards are based on 
quality of care and implemented by value driven payment methods [10, 11, 22, 23]. FPs should 
be leaders in the development and implementation of these and other novel health care models. 
Alternative and blended payment methods could be central in promoting professional equity 
among FPs and to support the expansion of innovative health care models. Therefore, 
professional equity of FPs has to be particularly measured, followed, and enhanced during this 
critical process. 
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An instrument designed to measure the perception of professional equity, specifically for 
physicians, was developed and tested by Dobson, Lepnurm and Struening [24] across Canada. 
This instrument could be used to measure professional equity and make comparisons among 
physicians. However, the authors of this instrument suggested that the questionnaire might 
benefit from further testing and improvements [24]. The objectives of this study are to: 1) 
confirm the internal structure of the instrument used to measure professional equity of 
physicians; 2) compare the levels of professional equity perceived by physicians paid by FFS, 
blended methods, and APP; 3) identify differences in the levels of fulfillment, income, and 
recognition dimensions of equity among physicians paid by FFS, APP and blended schemes; and 
4) test an interaction effect between specialty group and payment method on the levels of 
professional equity, controlling by number of patients seen per week, age and gender. 
2.2. Methods 
A cross-sectional study was conducted in Saskatoon Health Region (SHR) in 2011. SHR is 
the largest health region in Saskatchewan, actively involved in research and health human 
resources training [25]. All physicians in the region, except those who were on a leave of 
absence or those in a residency program, were invited to participate.  
Applying the Dillman method [26], physicians were sent a survey in the mail, offering an on-
line option to participate by e-mail. Three follow-up mails were sent to non-responders after the 
initial mail-out, with the last mailing including a one page non-response survey with key 
questions to check for response bias (Appendix E). Participants were asked about their 
perception of professional equity, among other well-being measures, type of payment plan, and 
demographic information. Ethics approval from the Behaviour Research Ethics Board, 
University of Saskatchewan, and operational approval from the SHR were obtained to conduct 
this study. 
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2.2.1. Measures 
The instrument used to measure professional equity of physicians consisted of 15-items with 
three dimensions (five items per dimension), evaluating perceived intangible and tangible 
rewards for practicing medicine [24]. The intangible rewards were measured by fulfillment and 
recognition dimensions, and the tangible rewards were measured by the dimension of income. 
The professional equity measure is capable of assessing the degree of fairness of the exchanges, 
linking specific demands of medical practice with different types of rewards. All of the items 
were scored using 6-point scales. The wording of all items was reviewed and two items which 
had poor loadings in the Canadian sample of physicians [24] were adjusted: “income reflects 
practice expense” to “how well income reflects years of experience”, and “proportion of 
uninteresting work” to “fulfillment with choices of activities carried out.” In addition, two new 
items were added to the recognition dimension: “dedication leads to career advancement” and 
“recognition from own family.” 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed, using the statistical software EQS 6.1, to 
confirm the internal structure validity of the questionnaire. A χ2/df ratio between 2 and 3, a Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) < 0.08 and a 95% C.I. with a lower boundary < 
0.06, a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) > 0.9, a Normed Fit Index (NFI) > 0.9, a Non-Normed Fit 
Index (NNFI) > 0.9, and an Incremental Fit Index (IFI) > 0.9 were considered as indicators of an 
adequate model adjustment [27]. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were computed for the measure as a whole and for each 
dimension, assessing internal consistency of the instrument. The levels of the overall equity scale 
were standardized by summing the scale items, then dividing by the number of items, yielding 
scores from 1.00 to 6.00. Similarly, standardized scores were computed for the dimensions of 
fulfilment, financial, and recognition equity. 
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2.2.2. Analysis 
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) and Scheffe tests were carried out to account for 
differences among payment methods (FFS, APP, and blended schemes) on the overall levels of 
professional equity and the three dimensions: fulfillment, recognition, and income equity. 
ANOVAs and T-Tests were used to compare professional equity levels among number of 
patients seen per week (< 40, 40-100, and > 100) and specialty groups (FPs vs. clinical/surgical 
specialists), respectively. 
In order to test the interaction effect between specialty group and payment method on 
professional equity, a linear regression model was used. First, unconditional analyses were 
carried out between the dependent variable (15-item professional equity scale) and each of the 
considered independent variables (payment method, specialty group, number of patients seen per 
week, age group, and gender). Second, the interaction effect between payment method and 
specialty group was tested in the model, controlling by number of patients seen per week, age 
group, and gender. Finally, possible interactions between payment method and other predictors 
were also tested. These analyses were completed using the statistical software SPSS® 20. 
2.3. Results 
The response rate was 48.1%; with 382 practitioners of the 794 eligible physicians completing 
the questionnaire. In total, 253 questionnaires were received on paper and 129 were submitted 
on-line. In the sample group, 136 participants (35.6%) were FPs, 233 (61%) respondents were 
from medical or surgical specialties, and the remaining 13 (3.4%) were pathologists. The mean 
age of the sample was 49.04 years (SD=11.4), and 18.45 (SD=12.3) was the mean years of 
experience. Furthermore, according to payment method for practicing medicine 45.3% (n=173) 
of physicians were paid by FFS, 24.6% (n=94) were remunerated by APP, and 30.1% (n=115) 
were paid by blended schemes of APP and FFS. Since there were only 13 pathologists and all 
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were paid by APP, this group was excluded from the analyses for an adjusted study population of 
369 physicians for this report. Table 2-1 presents characteristics of participants by specialty 
groups. 
Table 2-1.  Demographics by specialty groups (n = 382) 
 All 
physicians 
Family/general 
practitioners n(%) 
Medical-surgical 
specialists n(%) 
Pathologists† 
n(%) 
Age group (years-old) 
Less than 40 108 38 (35.2) 66 (61.1) 4 (3.7) 
Between 41 and 49 84 23 (27.4) 57 (67.9) 4 (3.7) 
Between 50 and 59 117 41 (35) 72 (61.5) 4 (3.7) 
More than 60 71 33 (46.5) 37 (52.1) 1 (1.4) 
Gender 
Female 142 57(40.1)* 77(54.2)* 8(5.6)* 
Male 240 79(32.9)* 156(65)* 5(2.1)* 
Payment method 
Pure FFS 173 101(54.4) # 72(41.6) # - 
Blended schemes 115 15(13) # 100(87) # - 
Pure APP 94 20(21.3) # 61(64.9) # 13(3.4)† 
Number of patients per week 
Less than 40 112 21 (18.9)# 90 (81.1) # - 
Between 40 and 100 137 36 (27.3)# 96 (72.7) # - 
More than 100 133 79 (62.7)# 47 (37.3) # - 
† Group omitted from further analyses due to lack of payment comparison category;# χ2 with p<0.001;* χ2 with p<0.05 
 
2.3.1. Confirmatory factor analysis of the professional equity measure 
Before performing the CFA, the minimum standards for factor analysis were verified: 
Bartlett’s Sphericity = 3,682.74, p < 0.001, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling 
was 0.88. Descriptive statistics for items and corrected item-total correlations are presented in 
Table 2-2. Almost all corrected item-total correlations ranged from 0.37 to 0.67; only two items 
had correlations below 0.3 (EQREC01=0.27 and EQREC07=0.25). 
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Table 2-2.  Professional equity questionnaire for physicians 
Item Mean S.D 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
α 
dimension 
Regarding fulfillment, consider the following aspects of your medical practice.  
(from 1 “Very Low” to 6 “Very High”) 
0.87 
EQFUL01 Your sense of gratification derived from providing care to patients is: 4.81 0.91 0.44  
EQFUL02 Your sense of contributing to society in your various roles as a physician is: 4.63 0.94 0.44  
EQFUL03 The opportunities to use your most advanced clinical skills are: 4.37 0.96 0.49  
EQFUL04 The choices you have over the activities you carry out or participate in are: 4.20 1.03 0.60  
EQFUL05 Your sense of accomplishment from your work as a physician is: 4.71 0.92 0.58  
How well does your income reflect: 
(from 1 “Not at all” to 6 “Perfectly”) 
0.94 
EQINC01 The time you spend on your duties? 3.85 1.36 0.60  
EQINC02 Your qualifications and training? 3.90 1.37 0.63  
EQINC03 Your responsibilities? 3.79 1.35 0.66  
EQINC04 The stresses of making risky decisions? 3.49 1.47 0.67  
EQINC05 Your years of experience? 3.44 1.59 0.60  
Regarding recognition, please consider the following aspects of your practice. 
(from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 6 “Strongly Agree”) 
0.79 
EQREC01 
Patients often express their appreciation 
for the clinical care that you provide to 
them. 
4.64 1.09 0.27  
EQREC02 Your contributions to the general well-being of your region are appreciated. 3.81 1.30 0.59  
EQREC03 
Your colleagues acknowledge extra 
efforts you make in carrying out your 
responsibilities. 
4.01 1.19 0.58  
EQREC04 Nurses you work with show respect for you as a physician. 4.72 1.05 0.37  
EQREC05 Administrators understand the stresses you experience as a physician. 2.98 1.33 0.48  
EQREC06 Your dedication as a physician has led to advances in your medical career. 4.21 1.17 0.55  
EQREC07 Your family understands the stresses you face as a physician. 4.54 1.18 0.25  
Note. n =369 (134 females and 235 males); Cronbach’s Alpha for 17-item Scale (α= 0.88) 
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Then, using the tri-dimensional structure proposed a priori for the professional equity measure 
for physicians [24], a CFA was performed including all 17 items. According to the robust 
maximum likelihood results, the initial model presented an adequate fit: χ2=307.63, df=113, 
p<0.001; χ2/df=2.72; RMSEA=0.07, 95% C.I.=0.06-0.08, CFI=0.93, NFI=0.9, NNFI=0.92, 
IFI=0.93. However, a model adjustment was required since two items presented low eigen values 
(EQREC01=0.44 and EQREC07=0.35). The item with the lowest eigen value (EQREC07 
“recognition obtained from own family”) was eliminated. The CFA with 16-items was run 
yielding similar results. Thus, EQREC01 item “recognition obtained from patients” was also 
eliminated. The final 15-item measure was tested and model fit indicators presented an 
improvement: χ2=233.46, df=84, p<0.001; χ2/df=2.78; RMSEA=0.07, 95% C.I.=0.06-0.08, 
CFI=0.94, NFI=0.92, NNFI=0.93, IFI=0.95; Figure 2-1 presents the final model with 
standardized estimates. This model yielded very good internal consistency reliability (α=0.89). 
The Cronbach’s alpha for each of the 5-item dimensions was: fulfillment, α=0.87; income, 
α=0.94; and recognition, α=0.79. This 15-item tri-dimensional questionnaire was considered for 
further analyses. 
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Figure 2-1.  CFA of the professional equity questionnaire for physicians: The tri-dimensional 
structure of the 15-item questionnaire (fulfillment, income and recognition equity) is illustrated 
with standardized estimates. 
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2.3.2. Professional equity by payment methods 
In the sample group, the mean level of professional equity was 4.06 (SD=0.76), ranging from 
1.53 to 5.67, and the median was 4.13. The means for the dimensions were: fulfillment, 4.55 
(SD=0.77); income, 3.70 (SD=1.28); and recognition, 3.94 (SD=0.90). 
One-way ANOVA showed significant differences in the levels of professional equity by 
payment method, p=0.004. Physicians paid by FFS perceived lower professional equity than 
those paid by APP (p=0.005). By dimensions, differences in income equity levels were found, 
p=0.03, as well as in the recognition dimension, p=0.001. Physicians paid by APP reported 
higher levels of income (p=0.03) and recognition equity (p=0.001) than those paid by FFS. There 
were no significant differences in the levels of fulfillment equity by payment method. 
Furthermore, a higher level of fulfillment equity was identified between physicians who see less 
than 40 patients per week and those who see over 100 (p=0.02). According to number of 
patients, there were no significant differences on the overall professional equity, either on the 
income and recognition dimensions. Finally, FPs perceived lower levels of professional equity 
than clinical-surgical specialists (p=0.003), as well as poorer levels of fulfillment (p=0.003) and 
income equity (p=0.008). Table 2-3 presents the mean levels of professional equity, overall and 
by each dimension, according to payment method, specialty group, and number of patients seen 
per week. 
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Table 2-3.  Mean (SD) levels of professional equity perceived by physicians according to 
payment method, specialty group, and number of patients seen per week 
n =369 
Professional 
equity levels 
Professional equity levels by dimension 
  Fulfillment Income Recognition 
All participants 4.06 (0.76) 4.55 (0.77) 3.70 (1.28) 3.94 (0.90) 
Payment method 
Fee-for-service (FFS) 3.94 (0.76)† 4.48 (0.82) 3.54 (0.10)* 3.80 (0.92)** 
Blended FFS-APP schemes 4.10 (0.76) 4.62 (0.74) 3.72 (0.12) 3.97 (0.88) 
Alternative payment plans 
(APP) 4.27 (0.70)
† 4.57 (0.69) 4.00 (0.15)* 4.23 (0.82)** 
Specialty group 
Family/general practitioners 3.91 (0.79) 4.39 (0.83) 3.47 (1.26) 3.88 (0.81) 
Medical-surgical specialists 4.15 (0.73)† 4.64 (0.71)† 3.83 (1.28)† 3.99 (0.87) 
Number of patients per week 
Less than 40 4.21 (0.79) 4.72 (0.79)* 3.90 (1.28) 4.01 (0.92) 
Between 40 and 100 4.02 (0.70) 4.50 (0.67) 3.56 (1.30) 4.00 (0.82) 
More than 100 3.98 (0.77) 4.44 (0.81)* 3.66 (1.25) 3.83 (0.95) 
* p<0.05; † p<0.01; ** p≤0.001 
 
2.3.3. Interaction effect between payment method and specialty group 
First, unconditional analyses identified that payment method (p=0.002), specialty group 
(p=0.001), and number of patients seen per week (p=0.03) were predictors of professional equity. 
Gender was kept in the model since it confounded coefficients of specialty group and number of 
patients per week; similarly, age group confounded the coefficients of payment method, number 
of patients, and specialty group. In the model with five predictors (see Table 2-4), a significant 
interaction effect between specialty group and payment method was identified (p=0.01). No 
significant interactions between payment methods and the other variables in the model were 
found.  
 50 
 
Figure 2-2.  Mean predicted levels and 95% C.I. of professional equity by payment method, 
specialty group, and number of patients seen per week. 
 
As depicted in Figure 2-2, a similar pattern across different ranges of patients seen per week 
were observed among FPs; higher levels of professional equity can be predicted among FPs with 
alternative payment plans (APP) and blended schemes in comparison to those paid with FFS, 
despite the number of patients seen per week. In contrast, small differences were observed 
among clinical/surgical specialists; slightly higher predicted levels of professional equity were 
found among physicians with APP and who see less than 40 patients per week. 
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Table 2-4.  Estimates and 95% CI of predictors in the linear regression model of professional 
equity levels of physicians 
 
Beta 95% CI p-value 
Number of patients per week 
Less than 40 Ref.   Between 40 and 100 -0.18 (-0.37, 0.00) 0.05 
More than 100 -0.16 (-0.37, 0.04) 0.11 
Specialty group 
Family/general practitioners Ref.   Medical-surgical specialists 0.41 (0.19, 0.64) <0.001 
Payment method 
Pure FFS Ref.   Blended 0.49 (0.10, 0.88) 0.01 
Pure APP 0.57 (0.22, 0.91) <0.001 
Gender 
Female Ref.   Male 0.08 (-0.08, 0.24) 0.33 
Age group 
Less than 40 year-old Ref.   Between 41 and 49 year-old -0.11 (-0.32, 0.10) 0.29 
Between 50 and 59 year-old -0.05 (-0.24, 0.14) 0.60 
More than 60 year-old 0.18 (-0.04, 0.40) 0.12 
Interaction payment and specialty group 
Blended*medical-surgical 
specialists -0.50 (-0.92, -0.07) 0.02 
APP*medical-surgical 
specialists -0.61 (-1.06, -0.17) 0.01 
Intercept 3.85 (3.60, 4.10) <0.001 
 
 
2.4. Discussion 
The structure of the instrument to assess professional equity of physicians has been 
confirmed. The instrument has three dimensions evaluating intangible and tangible rewards for 
physicians practicing medicine [24]. Adjustments have been done to items in the recognition 
dimension. Acknowledgments from colleagues, nurses, administrators, health region are relevant 
sources of recognition for physicians, as well as dedication leading to career advancement (the 
new item added to this dimension). Also, the physicians in our sample did not consider 
recognition from their family and patients to be essential. This may mean that physicians do not 
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expect credit or appreciation from patients for their professional efforts. Medical practitioners are 
more likely to expect trust from patients, perceived by provision of adequate information, 
compliance to recommended treatments, and engagement to self-care [28]. 
The ANOVA demonstrated that the perception of professional equity of physicians is 
associated with their payment method. This phenomena might be present because a specific 
contract could directly provide a balance between contributions and rewards [29] and, also 
because payment methods for physicians have an incentive effect on their behavior [30, 31]. 
Quantities of care delivered [15, 31] and the way that health services are provided [16, 31] are 
affected by payment method. As our study identified, APP could endorse a balance in the 
evaluation of contributions and rewards for practicing medicine. This impact was specifically 
observed in the income and recognition dimensions where practitioners under APP reported 
better levels of equity than those paid by FFS. Physicians paid by APP considered that they are 
receiving fair economic rewards according to their qualifications, training, experience, 
responsibilities, risks, and time devoted to medical practice. Physicians paid by APP perceived 
appropriate recognition from administrators and the health region for their contributions, as well 
as career advancements. In contrast, fulfillment equity could not be affected by payment method; 
this dimension is more an assessment of the intangible rewards for practicing medicine [24], 
being closely related to specialty and medical practice characteristics. 
Critical findings that require special attention are that FPs perceived poor fulfillment and 
income equity. Previous studies have described that FPs experience poor career satisfaction [17, 
18]. These results depict a lack of motivation among FPs who are fundamental in the provision 
of primary care. Indeed, strengthening primary care has been recommended as a strategy to 
improve health of populations [32]. In Canada, several provinces are engaged to change primary 
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health care, promoting inter-professional work, team-based care, and alternative payment 
arrangements [33]. Since income disparities are present among medical specialties [19], APP 
could be more supportive of primary care reforms by the enhancement of professional equity–
adjusting tangible and intangible rewards–of FPs. APP could help to explore more challenging 
and interesting medical practices. 
Ten years ago, the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology called for changes in the way that physicians are paid at the primary health care 
level, recommending APP [34]. During the last decade, there have been considerable efforts to 
explore alternative payment options to attract and retain FPs [30]; however, FFS is still the 
dominant method of payment across all Canadian provinces [13, 14]. Indeed, a single payment 
method cannot be recommended for all physicians because each scheme fits different scenarios. 
FFS is recommended as an incentive to increase quantity of care delivered and acceptance of 
new patients; capitation encourages preventive care and increases collaboration among 
providers; and, salaries along with blended schemes may be suitable for sparsely populated areas 
[31]. 
Non-FFS payment alternatives should support the development of innovative models based on 
inter-professional, coordinated, and ongoing care to promote a strong primary health system. 
Given that physicians self-select their payment method and the time dedicated to direct and 
indirect patient care varies [15, 16], FPs with a considerable number of elderly patients or cases 
with chronic conditions could be attracted by group practice. Other FPs might be interested in 
dedicating their full time practice to be hospitalists, leading a patient-centered model of care for 
the articulation of hospital and primary health services. Within these scenarios, APP could 
provide professional equity to motivate innovations in health care delivery. As identified in our 
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linear regression model, despite different volumes of patients, enhanced levels of professional 
equity among FPs with blended or alternative payment schemes could be predicted, a motivating 
factor which could support innovative primary care models. 
Despite the importance of remuneration highlighted in the present study, it is relevant to 
consider that payment is not the most important motivator among medical doctors. Key sources 
of motivation for physicians are professional autonomy [5, 35], achievement [6], relationships 
with patients [4], and interaction with colleagues [6, 36]. Motivation of physicians is affected by 
both financial and non-financial incentives which should be considered together for long term 
results [36, 37]. Policy makers need to recognize that motivation among physicians is complex 
and requires comprehensive approaches [3]. Therefore, there are personal and environmental 
factors that should be carefully studied in the evaluation of physicians’ well-being. 
Regarding limitations of this study, it needs to be acknowledged that this research was 
conducted on a sample of physicians practicing in one region among many in Canada. Results 
can be extrapolated to physicians practicing in the SHR and also to those practicing in similar 
health regions. Since this study was cross-sectional, relationships between variables are 
associations. We recommend further longitudinal research to evaluate the effect of APP. 
Covariates and potential confounders should be considered to study the impact of payment 
methods on physicians’ well-being indicators, considering both personal and environmental 
factors. 
2.5. Conclusions 
An instrument specifically designed for physicians to measure professional equity has been 
tested. This measure allows the overall evaluation of professional equity considering both 
intangible and tangible rewards for practicing medicine. The tri-dimensional structure of 
professional equity has been confirmed and showed good internal consistency. 
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Higher levels of professional equity were identified among physicians paid by APP in 
comparison to those paid by FFS. Furthermore, physicians paid by APP considered that they are 
receiving fair economic rewards and appropriate recognition. FPs perceived lower fulfillment 
and income equity in comparison to medical-surgical specialists. Moreover, enhanced levels of 
professional equity could be predicted among FPs with APP and blended schemes, controlling by 
the number of patients, age and gender. Thus, APP (salary, sessional, capitation, etc.) could be 
further explored to improve professional equity of FPs, promoting fairness and well-being 
among medical practitioners, and indirectly impact primary health care outcomes. APP bring a 
policy alternative to support the development of innovative primary care models. 
2.6. Contributions of the First Article to the Dissertation 
APP have a relevant impact on wellness of medical practitioners, identifying that physicians 
paid by APP perceive better professional equity in comparison to those with FFS schemes. The 
impact of APP was specifically observed on the perception of recognition and income equity of 
physicians. Moreover, APP offer a payment policy alternative to enhance professional equity of 
FPs and to improve the quality of primary health care. 
In the presence of persistent professional inequities, physicians experience distress that could 
result in a reduction of their inputs or leaving the practice [1]. APP might alleviate perceived 
professional inequities, and prevent related tensions and negative results. Daily stressors in 
medical practice could be also reduced if the wellness of physicians is promoted by endorsing 
professional equity. At the same time, professional inequities could be triggered if physicians 
experience high levels of distress; therefore, the effect of payment methods on daily distress is 
studied in this dissertation as a critical indicator of the wellness of physicians. 
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CHAPTER 3† 
ARTICLE TWO: PAYMENT METHOD AS A PREDICTOR OF THE DAILY 
DISTRESS EXPERIENCED BY PHYSICIANS 
† This chapter examines daily distress of physicians and payment methods for practicing 
medicine. The purpose of Chapter 3 is to evaluate if payment methods are associated with daily 
distress of medical practitioners. The contents of Chapter 3 have been published as: Peña-
Sánchez JN, Lepnurm R, Keegan D, et al. Payment method as a predictor of daily distress 
experienced by physicians. Journal of Hospital Administration. 2014;3:1-13. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jha.v3n5p1  
3.1. Introduction 
Health care professionals experience greater risk for burnout than other human service 
occupations [1, 2], and critical care environments are the most stressful [3, 4]. Other 
professionals such as teachers, lawyers, social workers, psychologists are also at risk of 
emotional exhaustion because relationships of trust are formed between providers of service and 
clients [2]. The distress faced by physicians and nurses is of ultimate legal responsibility over 
outcomes and pressures from high workloads [5-7]. Medical doctors are at a higher risk for 
burnout in comparison to individuals in other non-medical professions [1], and high stress among 
physicians affects well-being of these health professionals and quality of care provided to 
patients [8-13]. 
Physicians face intrinsic and unalterable tensions when practicing medicine due to working 
within an emotionally-charged environment, dealing with suffering and fear [8, 14]. The practice 
of medicine has repetitive and unavoidable daily distresses which are particularly evident in 
certain areas of care (e.g., intensive care units, emergency, and operating rooms) [1, 9]. Medical 
errors tend to occur when practitioners face intense physical and mental exhaustion [15], and 
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physicians are stressed when the quality of care is not as good as it could be [16]. Deterioration 
of physician-patient relationship [13, 17], increases in the amount of tests ordered [8, 13], and 
increases in the likelihood of medical errors [13, 17] have been observed among highly stressed 
physicians. 
In Europe and North America, about a quarter of physicians suffer from high levels of stress 
[10, 11]. In Canada, about 40% of physicians feel stressed at least once a week, emergency 
physicians and surgeons are specialists experiencing the highest levels of distress [9], and 
burnout and stress are commonly reported among family practitioners [9, 12]. Declines in 
clinical autonomy, increases in workloads, organizational changes, practice restrictions, and 
career dissatisfaction have been identified as added sources of stress in medical practice [8, 13, 
17, 18]. Governmental budget constraints to control rising system costs are further sources of 
stress since physicians experiencing changes to their workload have to find ways to access 
services and resources for the care of their patients [19]. In privately funded health care systems, 
interventions by health insurance companies restrict the autonomy and income of physicians, 
potentially affecting the quality of care [8]. These factors increase the inherent daily distress of 
medical practice, perpetuating a vicious circle of strain and stress. Furthermore, among different 
organizational and system changes, shifts in the way that physicians are paid have been 
suggested as sources of strain that might increase distress that physicians experience in their 
daily practice [10]. 
Since the introduction of Medicare in Canada, physicians have been traditionally paid by 
provincial/territorial governments through fee-for-service (FFS) schemes [20]. A considerable 
proportion of the increase in the health care expenditures has been attributed to FFS payment for 
physicians [21]. Alternative payment plans (APP) have been introduced, including salaries, 
 63 
capitation, sessional and blended schemes with FFS across Canada. During the last decade, APP 
have doubled their share among all payment methods for physicians [22, 23]; notwithstanding, 
there is disagreement about the impact of APP on the distress levels of physicians. Among 
Canadian family practitioners, no association was reported between stress and type of 
remuneration [12]. In the United Kingdom (UK), salaried physicians experienced less stress in 
carrying out management tasks than non-salaried practitioners [24]; however, higher stress levels 
were identified in the UK after the implementation of a specific contract which aimed to promote 
multidisciplinary teamwork [25]. 
The impact of payment schemes on the levels of stress among physicians requires considering 
confounding variables, such as practice features and allocation of time to academic and 
administrative duties. Consequently, the objectives of this study were to: 1) compare distress 
levels of physicians among FFS, APP, and blended schemes, in an unconditional analysis; 2) 
identify payment method and other factors predicting daily distress of physicians in a multi-level 
regression model, considering confounders which could affect associations; and 3) explore 
interactions between predictors of daily distress and payment method for practicing medicine. 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Study design 
A cross-sectional study was conducted in the Saskatoon Health Region (SHR), Saskatchewan, 
Canada, in 2011, by the MERCURi Research Group at the University of Saskatchewan. The 
SHR is the largest health authority of the province, including rural and urban areas, providing 
health care to about one third of the population of Saskatchewan, from primary services to 
specialized care, in an academic medical complex consisting of multiple health care 
organizations [26]. 
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3.2.2. Measures 
In this study, all physicians practicing in the region received a comprehensive questionnaire 
asking about daily levels of distress, practice settings, working hours, workload, payment 
method, and demographics. Physicians eligible to participate in the study were medical doctors 
on the list of practitioners in the SHR and who were practicing at the time of the study; those 
physicians who were on a leave of absence or in a residency program were not eligible to 
participate in the study. Applying the Dillman Method [27], eligible physicians received a cover 
letter, a questionnaire, and a prepaid return envelope by post inviting them to participate in the 
study. An on-line option to participate was also offered by e-mail. Three reminders followed the 
initial invitation. In addition, a one-page questionnaire was attached to the last reminder in order 
to test non-response bias (Appendix E). The Behavioral Research Ethics Board of the University 
of Saskatchewan and the SHR provided ethical and operational approvals, respectively. 
The Daily Distress measure developed by Lepnurm, Lockhart, and Keegan [9] was used. This 
measure evaluated the concepts of fatigue and reaction, identifying those practitioners who need 
more time off than a weekend, those with feelings of frustration and desensitization, and those 
who are at risk of burnout [9]. The distress measure had one overall question of distress and 16 
items all scored on 7 point scales from never to daily (see Table 3-1). Levels of daily distress 
experienced by physicians were standardized by summing the items and dividing by 16, yielding 
standardized scores ranging from a minimum 1.00 to a maximum of 7.00. 
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Table 3-1. Questionnaire to measure daily distress of physicians used in the present study 
How frequently do you: Never 
A few 
times a 
year 
Once a 
month 
2 - 3 
times a 
month 
Once a 
week 
2 - 3 
times a 
week 
Every 
day 
Have workdays which are so busy that you are 
physically exhausted at the end of the day? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Have such demanding workdays that you are 
emotionally drained at the end of the day? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Suffer from fatigue due to working late nights and/or 
nights? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Express impatience when people do not respond to 
requests as quickly as they should have? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Express anger when people at work make mistakes? [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Have workdays when you can devote enough time to all 
of your patients? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel frustrated accessing facilities/services for patients?     [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel depressed because of the death or serious illness of 
a patient? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel that your work has desensitized your feelings/ 
emotions? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Experience frustration dealing with demanding 
patients? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
End up doing tasks which you think are outside of your 
responsibilities? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Cancel a personal or social activity in order to meet 
work commitments? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Experience conflict between responsibilities at work 
and at home? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel that you can concentrate on the tasks that should 
be done? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel that you are in control of your day-to-day working 
activities?  
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
Feel confident that you have been able to do your work 
at a high standard of care? 
[   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ] 
How would you rate your level of stress? [Very Low] [Low] [Moderate] [High] [Very high] 
 
As independent variables, physicians were asked about the number of patients seen per week, 
proportion of patients seen with complex medical/social conditions, number of hours worked per 
week, and time spent on patient care, academic, and administrative activities. Physicians were 
asked about their payment methods for medical practice, capturing proportions of payments 
received by FFS and APP. Then, payment methods were classified in three groups: paid only by 
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FFS or APP, and paid by blended schemes of FFS and APP. In addition, levels of career 
satisfaction of physicians were measured using a 16-item questionnaire previously tested among 
Canadian physicians [28]. 
3.2.3. Statistical Analysis 
The reliabilities of the measures were confirmed using Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of 
internal consistency [29]. A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between reported 
overall levels of stress and standardized distress levels. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was used to compare standardized scores of daily distress according to payment method as an 
unconditional evaluation. Also, ANOVAs and T-Tests were used to identify the main factors 
affecting daily distress of physicians. 
3.2.3.1. Multivariable analysis 
Since several variables might act as confounders in the relationship between payment method 
and daily distress levels, a multivariable analysis was required to identify predictors of distress 
and the role of payment method as a predictor in this model. Also, given that distress of 
physicians could be clustered by geographical area of practice within the SHR (distress of 
physicians practicing in rural areas might be more similar than those practicing in urban areas, or 
distress of those in deprived areas of the city could be more alike, as well as the distress 
experienced by those working within the same hospitals, clinic, and medical centers), a multiple-
level model was built to account for individual (fixed portion) and unmeasured environmental 
factors (random component). Thus, the first three postal code characters – Forward Sortation 
Area (FSA) – of physicians’ mailing addresses were used in the random portion of the model. 
The FSA was considered as a geographical proxy to account for the influence of environment on 
daily distress. Age, gender, specialty group, career satisfaction, regular working hours per week, 
number of weekends on call, number of patients per week during regular hours and on call, 
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proportion of patients with complex conditions, time devoted to academic and administrative 
activities, practice setting, and payment method were considered as independent variables in the 
fixed portion of the model. 
First, a null model was built to evaluate clustering of the outcome using the intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) = σ2μ / (σ2μ+σ2ε) [30], where σ2μ is the variance at the FSA level and 
σ2ε is the variance at the individual level. Unconditional analyses were performed for each 
independent variable. The assumption of linearity between the outcome and the independent 
variables was checked with a quadratic term for the continuous independent variables to decide 
whether to include them as continuous or categorical variables. Then, the backward method was 
used in the model building process. Excluded variables were tested as confounders. Interactions 
between payment method and predictors of daily distress were also evaluated. Using the final 
model, mean predicted values were computed and depicted for interacting variables. Residuals 
for the cluster and individual levels were evaluated. Analyses were performed in STATA 12 and 
the model building was carried out using the xtmixed procedure, at a 5% level of significance. 
3.3. Results 
From the 794 eligible physicians, 382 doctors completed the questionnaire, corresponding to a 
48.1% response rate. Geographically, participants had their offices distributed among 12 FSA 
within the SHR (on average, 31.8 physicians per FSA with 91.7% of units replicated). As 
presented in Table 3-2, the mean age in the sample was 49.0 (SD = 11.40) years, 142 were 
females and 240 were males. On regular hours, physicians reported working 54.9 (SD = 16.55) 
hours/week on average; only 15.4% of the participants reported that they work 40 or less hours 
per week and 20% of them stated that they work more than 3 weekends per month. Of total 
regular working hours, on average, 27.2% of the time was dedicated to academic activities and 
8.7% to administrative duties. The mean number of patients seen per week was 84.9 (SD = 
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76.21); the average proportion of patients with complex socio-medical conditions was 47.3% 
(SD = 25.79). Regarding payment method, 173 physicians were paid by FFS, 94 by APP, and 
115 by blended schemes. Table 3-2 also presents demographic, workload, practice 
organizational, and well-being factors by payment methods. Non-response bias was checked by 
comparing participants and non-participants according to age group, specialty group, gender, 
distress, and satisfaction levels; and found to be negligible (Appendix F). 
Table 3-2. Descriptive statistics of respondents in the sample and by payment method: mean (SD) and 
n (%) 
N = 382 Total Payment method 
 Group FFS (45.3%) Blended (30.1%) APP (24.6%) 
Demographic factors     
Age (years-old) 49.04 (11.40) 50.60 (11.78) 48.03 (10.84) 47.41 (11.09) 
Gender     
Female 142 (37.2%) 59 (41.5%) 44 (31%) 39 (27.5%) 
Male 240 (62.8%) 114 (47.5%) 71 (29.6%) 55 (22.9%) 
Specialty group     
Family/general practitioners 136 (35.6%) 101 (74.3%) 15 (11%) 20 (14.7%) 
Medical-surgical specialists 233 (61%) 72 (30.9%) 100 (42.9%) 61 (26.2%) 
Pathologists 13 (3.4%) - - 13 (100%) 
Workload factors     
Regular working hours 
(total number of hours x week) 54.90 (16.55) 55.49 (17.51) 57.02 (16.86) 51.24 (13.67) 
Patients seen on regular hours 
(number patients x week) 84.88 (76.21) 109.31 (80.44) 61.65 (69.02) 68.33 (62.72) 
Number of weekends on call     
None 75 (19.6%) 35 (46.7%) 11 (14.7%) 29 (38.7%) 
One 118 (30.9%) 54 (45.8%) 35 (29.7%) 29 (24.6%) 
Two 111 (29.1%) 44 (39.6%) 42 (37.8%) 25 (22.5%) 
Three or more 77 (20.2%) 39 (50.6%) 27 (35.1%) 11 (14.3%) 
Patients seen on call 
(number patients x week) 12.35 (24.15) 13.09 (23.51) 17.52(31) 4.66 (9.76) 
Patients with complex socio-
medical conditions  
(proportion of total patients) 
47.33 (25.79) 40.46 (24.33) 53.24 (25.07) 52.77 (26.42) 
Practice organizational factors     
Practice setting     
Solo practice 70 (18.3%) 33 (47.1%) 17 (24.3%) 20 (28.6%) 
Group practice 312 (81.7%) 140 (44.9%) 98 (31.4%) 74 (23.7%) 
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Time dedicated to academic duties 
(proportion of total working hours) 27.17 (21.94) 17.94 (17.85) 36.16 (21.63) 33.17 (22.67) 
Time dedicated to administrative 
duties 
(proportion of total working hours) 
(12.10) 6.14 (8.04) 9.14 (10.97) 12.83 (17.42) 
Well-being factors     
Career satisfaction level* 4.22 (0.61) 4.19 (0.63) 4.25 (0.63) 4.25 (0.54) 
Daily distress levels† 3.31 (0.89) 3.34 (0.95) 3.22 (0.86) 3.36 (0.81) 
Overall perceived stress     
Very low 13 (3.4%) 7 (58.8%) 3 (23.1%) 3 (23.1%) 
Low 68 (17.8%) 35 (51.5%) 22 (32.4%) 11 (16.2%) 
Moderate 192 (50.4%) 86 (44.8%) 57 (29.7%) 49 (25.5%) 
High 94 (24.7%) 35 (37.2%) 30 (31.9%) 29 (30.9%) 
Very high 14 (3.7%) 10 (71.4%) 3 (21.4%) 1 (7.1%) 
Note. *Cronbach’s α of the career satisfaction measure = 0.84; †Cronbach’s α of the daily distress measure = 0.87 
 
According to the overall levels of stress reported by physicians, 21.2% experienced very low 
or low stress, 50.4% moderate, and 28.4% high or very high (see Table 3-3). In the standardized 
distress score from 1.00 to 7.00, the mean level of daily distress experienced by physicians was 
3.31 (SD = 0.89), and the median was 3.31. The reliability for the daily distress 16-item 
questionnaire was very good (α = 0.87), and was similar across specialty groups [family and 
general practitioners (α = 0.89), medical-surgical specialists (α = 0.86), and pathologists (α = 
0.90)]. The correlation between standardized distress score with the overall perceived stress was 
r = 0.62 (P < .001). The standardized score of daily distress experienced by physicians was used 
as the dependent continuous variable for the subsequent unconditional and multivariable 
analyses. 
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Table 3-3. Daily distress of physicians according to demographics, workload, and practice 
organizational factors (n=382) 
Variable Categories Daily distress Mean(SD) 
Demographic factors 
Age group 
<41 year-old 3.47 (0.81)‡ 
41 - 49 year-old 3.57 (0.77) 
50 - 59 year-old 3.24 (0.90) 
>59 year-old 2.87 (0.96)‡ 
Gender 
Female 3.43 (0.84) 
Male 3.24 (0.92) 
Specialty group 
Family/general practitioners 3.45 (0.96) 
Medical-surgical specialists 3.23 (0.84) 
Pathologists 3.34 (0.99) 
Workload factors 
Regular working hours 
per week 
<48 3.06 (0.97)‡ 
48 – 61 3.30 (0.80) 
>61 3.56 (0.83)‡ 
Number of patients seen 
on regular hours x week 
<40 2.93 (0.85)‡ 
40-100 3.43 (0.85)‡ 
>100 3.50 (0.88)‡ 
Number of weekend days 
on call 
None 3.00 (0.99)† 
One 3.22 (0.88) 
Two 3.46 (0.82)† 
Three or more 3.53 (0.82)† 
Number of patients seen 
on call x week 
None 3.20 (1.01) 
One to 10 3.29 (0.83) 
11 or more 3.48 (0.84) 
Patients with complex 
socio-medical conditions 
<25% 3.15 (0.89) 
25% - 75% 3.34 (0.92) 
>75% 3.40 (0.80) 
Practice organizational factors 
Payment method 
FFS 3.34 (0.95) 
Blended 3.22 (0.86) 
APP 3.36 (0.81) 
Practice setting 
Solo practice 3.04 (0.99)† 
Group practice 3.37 (0.86)† 
Time dedicated to 
academic duties  
< 10% 3.47 (0.96) 
10% - 30% 3.26 (0.83) 
>30% 3.22 (0.88) 
Time dedicated to 
administrative duties 
<5% 3.23 (0.98) 
5% - 10% 3.43 (0.79) 
>10% 3.32 (0.81) 
Note: †p<.01; ‡p<.001   
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3.3.1. Unconditional analyses 
By payment method, ANOVA did not identify significant differences in levels of daily 
distress, F(2, 379) = 0.78 (P = .46). Unconditional analyses showed that the main factors 
affecting daily distress were age group, F(3, 376) = 10.41 (P < .001), hours worked per week, 
F(2, 379) = 10.58 (P < .001), number of patients seen on regular hours, F(2, 379) = 15.78 (P < 
.001), number of weekends on call, F(3, 377) = 6.14 (P < .001), and practice setting, t(380) = -
2.81 (P = .005). As presented in Table 3-3, higher levels of distress were identified among 
younger physicians in comparison to older physicians (P < .001), those working more than 61 
hours/week versus practitioners working less than 48 hours/week (P < .001), physicians who see 
more 100 patients/week versus those who see less than 40 patients/week (P < .001), practitioners 
working three or more weekends or holidays per month in comparison to those that do not (P = 
.004), and among physicians working in a group versus those in a solo practice (P = .005). 
The null model identified that 8% of the variation in the outcome was explained by clustering 
of physicians (ICC = 0.08, 95% CI 0.02 to 0.28). Then, the majority of the predictors were 
significant in the unconditional analyses; only time devoted to academic duties, specialty group, 
and payment method were not significant (P-values > .05). Payment method was considered in 
the multivariable analysis, since we hypothesized that it is a predictor of distress when 
controlling by confounders. Only career satisfaction and number of patients seen on call met the 
linearity assumption, being used in their continuous form. Other continuous independent 
variables were classified into categories based on their distribution: working hours/week, number 
of patients seen on regular hours per week, time devoted to academic and administrative duties, 
and percentage of patients with complex socio-medical conditions were divided by tertiles. 
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3.3.2. Multivariable analysis 
Using the backward method, an initial model was defined. This model included as significant 
predictors of distress: payment method (P = .04), age group (P < .001), number of patients/week 
on regular hours (P < .001), number of weekends on call (P = .04), proportion of patients with 
complex conditions (P = .01), and career satisfaction (P < .001); Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) = 804.33. Then, removed variables of the model were tested as confounders. Regular 
working hours/week were found to confound the coefficients of payment method and proportion 
of complex patients; time devoted to academic duties confounded the coefficients of payment 
method; and time dedicated to administrative tasks confounded the coefficients of age group and 
payment method. Along with gender [31, 32], regular working hours/week, time devoted to 
academic duties, and time dedicated to administrative tasks were added to obtain an adjusted 
model with ten predictors (AIC = 806.97). Afterwards, interactions between predictors of 
distress and payment methods were tested. Only one significant interaction was identified: 
payment method interacted with the proportion of patients with complex socio-medical 
conditions, χ2 = 12.23, df = 2; P = .02. 
Ydistress = β0 + β1XAge_g + β2XGender + β3XReg_wh + β4X#pts + β5XComplex + β6XAcad + β7XAdmin 
+β8XWeekends + β9XPayment + β10XSatisfaction + β11XComplexXPayment + μ + ε  
(1) 
where,  
 
XAge_g: age group, reference category=less than 41 year-old  
XGender: physician’s gender, reference category=female  
Xreg_wh: regular working hours per week, reference category=less than 48 hours 
X#pts: number of patients seen on regular hours, reference category=less than 61  
XComplex: patients with complex socio-medical conditions, reference category=less than 25%  
XAcad: time dedicated to academia of total working hours, reference category=less than 10%  
XAdmin: time dedicated to administration of total working hours, reference category=less than 5%  
XWeekends: number of weekends on call, reference category=none  
XPayment: payment method for practicing medicine, reference category=FFS  
XSatisfaction: levels of career satisfaction of physician  
μ: group error by Forward Sortation Area (FSA) of physicians’ practice office  
ε: individual error.  
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Then, the final predicting equation was: 
 
Ydistress = 5.45 + 0.04XAge_g2 – 0.21XAge_g3 – 0.51XAge_g4 – 0.07XGender_g2 – 0.04XReg_wh_g2 + 
0.14XReg_wh_g3 + 0.31X#pts_g2 + 0.43X#pts_g3 + 0.28XComplex_g2 + 0.41XComplex_g3 – 0.17XAcad_g2 – 
0.2XAcad_g3 + 0.11XAdmin_g2 + 0.14XAdmin_g3 + 0.14XWeekends_g2 + 0.25XWeekends_g3 + 
0.32XWeekends_g4 + 0.49XPayment_g2 + 0.15XPayment_g3 – 0.62XSatisfaction – 0.53XComplex_g2XPayment_g2 + 
0.22XComplex_g2XPayment_g3 – 0.36XComplex_g3XPayment_g2 – 0.15XComplex_g3XPayment_g3 
(2) 
 
The final model indicated a better fit (AIC = 802.93) and reported that 9% of the outcome 
variation was explained by clustering of practice area. Residuals for the two levels of the model 
were assessed and found to be reasonable, ranging between 2 and -2 standard deviations from 
zero. According to the final model (see equations), career satisfaction of physicians was 
identified as a protective predictor. Distress of physicians decreased by 0.62 per unit of increase 
in the levels of career satisfaction (P < .001). Similarly, older physicians had 0.51 less distress 
than those who were younger than 41 years-old (P < .001). The distress of physicians who see 
more than 100 patients/week and between 40 and 100 patients/week increased 0.43 units and 
0.31 units, respectively, versus those who see 40 or less patients/week (P ≤ .001). The impact of 
workload on distress can be also observed by the number of weekends and holidays on-call per 
month. The distress of those who are two days and three or more days on-call per month 
increased 0.25 (P = .02) and 0.32 (P = .004) units, respectively, in comparison to those who are 
not on-call (see Table 3-4). 
 
 
 
 
 74 
Table 3-4. Non-interacting predictors of daily distress obtained in the multilevel linear regression 
model*, †, ‡ 
Covariant categories β 95% CI P-value 
Age group (year-old) <41 ref.   
41 - 49 0.04 (-0.15 to 0.24) .70 
50 - 59 -0.21 (-0.39 to -0.03) .02 
>59 -0.51 (-0.72 to -0.30) <.001 
Gender Female ref.   
Male -0.07 (-0.22 to 0.08) .38 
Regular working hours x week <48 ref.   
48 - 61 -0.04 (-0.22 to 0.13) .63 
>61 0.14 (-0.04 to 0.33) .13 
Number of patients seen on 
regular hours x week 
<40 ref.   
40-100 0.31 (0.13 to 0.48) .001 
>100 0.43 (0.24 to 0.63) <.001 
Time dedicated to academic 
duties of total working hours 
< 10% ref.   
10% - 30% -0.17 (-0.36 to 0.01) .07 
>30% -0.20 (-0.39 to 0.01) .05 
Time dedicated to 
administrative duties of total 
working hours 
<5% ref.   
5% - 10% 0.11 (-0.06 to 0.27) .21 
>10% 0.14 (-0.04 to 0.32) .12 
Number of weekends on call x 
month 
None ref.   
One 0.14 (-0.05 to 0.33) .15 
Two 0.25 (0.04 to 0.45) .02 
Three or 
more 
0.32 (0.10 to 0.55) .004 
Levels of career satisfaction  -0.62 (-0.74 to -0.51) <.001 
Constant  5.45 (4.83 to 6.08) <.001 
* Model’s Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 802.93 
† Group variance, σ2µ=0.04, and individuals variance, σ2ε = 0.41 
‡ Model’s intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) = 0.09, 95% CI, 0.02 to 0.39 
 
In relation to the levels of distress of physicians by payment method and percentage of 
patients seen with complex socio-medical conditions, the Figure 3-1 presents predicted levels of 
distress by these interacting variables. Lower levels of distress were predicted among physicians 
who see more than 75% of patients with complex conditions when paid by APP in comparison to 
practitioners who see the same proportion of complex cases and who are paid by FFS or blended 
schemes. In contrast, higher levels of distress were found among physicians with 25% to 75% of 
complex cases who are paid by APP versus those paid by blended methods. Among practitioners 
 75 
who see a small proportion of complex cases, similar levels of distress were observed between 
physicians paid by APP and FFS; conversely, there were high distress levels predicted among 
those paid by blended schemes. 
 
Figure 3-1. Daily distress levels of physicians by interacting covariates. The figure depicts the 
mean and corresponding 95% CI of predicted distress levels according to payment method and 
percentage of patients with complex socio-medical conditions. It appears that physicians who see 
more than 75% of patients with complex conditions perceived lower distress levels when paid by 
APP than when paid by FFS or blended schemes. In contrast, higher levels of distress were 
perceived among physicians paid by APP and FFS with a mix profile of complex cases, between 
25% and 75%, than those paid with blended methods. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
Comparing distress levels of physicians according to payment method without controlling for 
other variables shows no differences, which is in agreement with a previous Canadian study [12]; 
however, this is an unadjusted evaluation which does not take into account confounders and 
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other covariates. As our results identified in the multivariable analysis, payment method is a 
significant predictor of distress perceived by physicians when other predictors and confounding 
variables are considered in the assessment of this association. Gender [31, 32], time devoted to 
academic [9, 33] and administrative duties [9], and total number of working hours [34] are 
significant factors and they should be incorporated in distress models. Physicians self-select a 
payment method [35] and when they are paid by non-FFS schemes they tend to distribute their 
time differently [36]. In our sample, physicians under APP and mixed payment models dedicated 
more time to academic and administrative duties (see Table 3-2). Moreover, since APP have 
been recommended and used to involve physicians in academic and administrative duties [36], 
proportions of time dedicated to these activities are potential confounding variables which need 
to be considered. 
Predictors of distress were identified in the mixed linear regression model. First, the fixed 
portion of the model demonstrated that age group, patients seen per week, weekends on call, 
proportion of patients with complex conditions and payment methods are relevant predictors of 
distress, as well as career satisfaction of physicians. The latter has been acknowledged as a 
protective factor [8, 37]; it should be considered as an indicator of physicians’ well-being, and, 
indirectly, of quality of care and patient safety. Second, the random component of the mixed 
model acknowledged those unmeasured factors at the cluster level; this was approached using 
the FSA, capturing a general practice environment (rural/urban location, neighborhood, hospital, 
clinic, medical centre, or group practice) which influences distress experienced by physicians. In 
fact, a previous study identified conditions in the work environment (e.g. safety programs and 
practice, cleanliness, orderliness, good team communication) and organizational features (e.g. 
teamwork, staffing ratios, quality improvement processes) as factors affecting the well-being of 
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health professionals [38]. The psychosocial work environment matters because low job control, 
co-worker support, supervisor support, procedural justice, and relational justice are related with 
stress-related disorders [39]. Our multivariable analysis not only recognized payment method as 
a significant factor affecting distress of physicians but also it identified an interaction effect 
between payment method and the proportion of complex patients in the prediction of daily 
distress. 
Physicians paid by APP and who see a high proportion of complex patients probably 
experience less distress because they might be able to dedicate quality and quantity of time to 
patients with complex medical and/or social conditions. Non-FFS payment methods might be 
operating as an incentive to invest extra time for these patients, removing time pressure. The 
Nova Scotia Ministry of Health recognized that the common payment method in emergency 
room – FFS – frustrates and stresses physicians who perceive that FFS leads to high-volume 
“turnstile medicine” [40]. Physicians experience frustration because they cannot provide 
appropriate care to patients with complex medical conditions [41]. 
Lack of time [41, 42] and inadequate payment systems [41] have been identified as causes of 
inadequate care for patients with complex conditions. Innovative primary care models for 
patients with complex care needs require an inter-professional team, like the IMPACT Clinic 
initiative in Toronto [43, 44]. Also, the Nova Scotia Ministry of Health strategically planned the 
development of APP for emergency care physicians [40]. APP could be a supportive choice for 
health care systems, providing a fixed income for comprehensive care for complex patients, 
putting aside time pressure. In contrast, FFS and blended schemes might not be appropriate for 
physicians who see high proportions of complex patients because variable components of these 
payment methods could add pressure to daily practice. 
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Since this study was cross-sectional, relationships between predictors and the distress 
experienced by physicians are associations. The response rate was adequate since response-bias 
was checked and found to be negligible (Appendix F). The multi-level applied technique allows 
controlling for environmental factors that contribute to distress of physicians on their daily 
practice. The results of this study could be extrapolated to physicians practicing within the SHR 
and other health authorities across Canada with similar characteristics to the SHR. Further 
studies evaluating the impact of payment methods using a longitudinal perspective are 
recommended. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Workload, working hours, and type of patients are important covariates of distress that have 
to be considered in the prediction of daily distress of physicians, as well as the levels of career 
satisfaction of practitioners. Payment method was identified as a predictor of daily distress in the 
multivariable analysis, demonstrating the importance of considering other variables, such as time 
devoted to academic duties and time dedicated to administrative tasks, given that they could 
confound this relationship. Furthermore, our model identified that payment method is a predictor 
of daily distress which also interacts with proportion of complex cases. 
APP could be recommended to promote the provision of care for patients with complex 
conditions since low distress levels can be predicted among physicians who see more than three 
quarters of complex cases and are paid by APP. This is a relevant finding that needs to be 
considered to improve well-being of practitioners engaged with provision of care for patients 
with complex conditions and, indirectly, ensure quality of care and outcomes among these 
patients. 
 79 
3.6. Contributions of the Second Article to the Dissertation 
To understand the complex association between daily distress and payment models, this study 
considered individual and environmental factors that predict the distress of physicians. In 
contrast to previous studies evaluating an association between payment models and stress of 
physicians [12, 24, 25], this study identified that daily distress experienced by physicians 
differed according to payment systems. This study also found that payment methods interact with 
the percentage of patients seen with complex conditions. APP are capable of promoting lower 
levels of distress among practitioners working with patients who have complex social and 
medical conditions. This evidence could definitely impact the wellness of medical practitioners 
and patients who require a different provision of care. APP could be tailored for innovative and 
effective health care delivery where patients could have optimal time according to their own 
medical and social needs. 
APP have been associated with improved professional equity and low distress of medical 
practitioners. Since the wellness of male and female physicians differs [31], the impact of 
payment models on the perception of professional equity and distress requires to be investigated 
by gender. Given that career satisfaction is a long term indicator of wellness of physicians [28] 
and is associated with their perceptions of distress and equity, this indicator needs to be included 
as a covariate in the evaluation of the effect of gender and payment methods on the wellness of 
medical practitioners. 
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CHAPTER 4† 
ARTICLE THREE: LATENT GENDER INEQUALITIES IN THE WELL-BEING OF 
PHYSICIANS ACCORDING TO PAYMENT METHOD FOR PRACTICING 
MEDICINE  
† This chapter examines gender inequalities in the wellness of physicians and the role that 
payment methods have in these inequalities. The purpose of chapter 4 is to identify differences in 
the levels of professional equity, daily distress, and career satisfaction of physicians by gender 
and payment methods. The contents of Chapter 4 have been published as: Peña-Sánchez JN, 
Lepnurm R, Bermedo-Carrasco S. Latent gender inequalities in the well-being of physicians 
according to payment method for practicing medicine: a cross-sectional study. Journal of 
Hospital Administration. 2013;2:7-14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/jha.v2n4p7 
4.1. Introduction 
The correlation between the well-being of physicians and the quality of health care has been 
recognized as a relevant association that requires further comprehension, awareness, and 
interventions [1, 2]. Physicians’ wellness indicators should be incorporated into the evaluation of 
health care systems [3] and gain the attention of policy and decision makers. Boundaries between 
work and personal spheres are essential in promoting work-life balance among physicians [4], 
but these limits are difficult to create, especially for female physicians [5, 6]. The proportion of 
female physicians has increased considerably during the last 30 years, especially among family 
physicians [7]. Conflicts between work and home play significant roles in burnout, and the 
predictors of burnout differ by gender, with the stressors of exhaustion and disengagement 
stronger among women [8]. A study of physicians in Western Canada examined interactions 
among work-to-family conflicts by gender and parental status, finding a considerable percentage 
of physicians who are mothers reporting high levels of work-to-family conflicts [9]. 
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Another conflict for female physicians is that they perceive obstacles in their career 
development which negatively affect their career satisfaction. Female medical school faculty 
perceive gender discrimination in promotions, allocations of space, access to administrative staff, 
and the assignment of graduate students [6]. There is evidence that female specialists are paid 
slightly less in comparison to male physicians [10]. In addition, it has been reported that new 
cohorts of female physicians tend to choose alternative payment methods [11] rather than the 
traditional fee-for-service (FFS) schemes. 
FFS has been blamed for escalating costs of the health care system, accounting for more than 
half the average annual growth of physician spending in Canada [12], and for generating more 
but briefer patient encounters, affecting quality of care provided and satisfaction of physicians at 
the primary care level [13]. Most Canadian physicians continue to be paid by FFS, but during the 
last decade alternative payment plans (APP), such as salary, capitation, sessional or blended 
forms, have been gaining popularity, increasing from 10.6% in 2000 to 26.8% of all payments 
for physicians in 2010 [14]. Despite this transformation in payment systems, available evidence 
does not explain the impact of APP on the satisfaction of physicians, and the shift from FFS to 
APP can be considered a “philosophical change” which might modify clinical and personal 
priorities of practitioners [15]. Therefore, it is important to study the effects of APP, FFS, or 
blended payment systems on career satisfaction and professional equity, given that these two 
concepts are aspects of motivation [16]: career satisfaction is a longitudinal perception of 
outcomes evaluating both higher- and lower-order motivational needs [17]; and professional 
equity is a short term process-oriented perception, evaluating the balance between contributions 
made and rewards received [18]. In addition, since stress affects satisfaction and rewards, levels 
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of daily distress need to be concurrently measured when studying well-being of physicians and 
payment methods. 
Several studies have analyzed the impact of payment methods on quantity and quality of 
health services [19], but differences in the levels of career satisfaction, fulfillment-recognition 
rewards, and daily distress of physicians by payment method have not been explored. In 
addition, studies about factors affecting the well-being of physicians need to consider gender 
differences [20]. The objectives of this paper are to identify differences in the levels of career 
satisfaction, fulfillment-recognition rewards, and daily distress of physicians by gender and 
payment method (FFS, APP, and blended forms); and to assess interactions between gender and 
payment method on the three measures of physicians’ well-being. 
4.2. Subject and Methods 
A cross-sectional study was conducted in 2011, including all physicians practicing in rural 
and urban areas of the Saskatoon Health Region (SHR). The SHR is the largest health region in 
Saskatchewan (SK), Canada, providing health care for about 318,000 people (30% of the 
province population), and encompasses rural and urban areas (including six First Nations 
reserves). It is a referral center of specialized care for SK and an academic healthcare 
organization. The Region includes 10 hospitals, with three tertiary hospitals in the Saskatoon city 
[21]. Medical doctors registered in the list of practitioners of the SHR (850 by May 2011) were 
considered as the sample frame. Eligible physicians to participate in the study were those 
practicing in the SHR as a health care provider (inclusion criterion). Physicians in a residency 
program, retired, or on a leave of absence were excluded from the study (exclusion criteria). This 
study received ethics approval from the Behavior Research Ethics Board of the University of 
Saskatchewan, and Operational Approval from the SHR. 
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Eligible physicians were sent a questionnaire and a cover letter, explaining the nature and 
importance of the study and inviting them to participate either by post or on-line, using 
recommendations from the Tailored Dillman Approach [22]. Physicians who did not return their 
questionnaires were contacted one and two months after the first mail-out by post, receiving a 
letter highlighting the importance of their participation in the study, a copy of the questionnaire 
booklet, and a pre-stamped envelope; also, three reminders were sent by e-mail. Four months 
after the first contact, non-participant physicians received a one page non-response survey to 
check for response bias (Appendix E). The questionnaire asked about current remuneration 
method (pure FFS, pure APP, or blended methods), career satisfaction, professional equity, daily 
distress, and demographic factors. 
4.2.1. Measures 
The measure of career satisfaction contained inherent and performance dimensions to capture 
satisfaction with higher-order needs, and personal and professional dimensions to capture 
satisfaction of lower-order needs [17]. The measure has four items for each of the four 
dimensions, all scored on six-point scales, from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied.” Mean 
levels of overall career satisfaction were computed for the 16-item scale, scored from 1.00 to 
6.00. 
Professional equity was measured in three dimensions: fulfillment (five items), financial (five 
items), and recognition (five items) rewards for practicing medicine [18]. All the items scored on 
six-point Likert scales. For this study, the dimensions of fulfillment and recognition equity were 
combined. The scale was scored from 1.00 to 6.00. 
The distress experienced by physicians in their daily practice was measured in two 
dimensions: fatigue and reaction [23]. All items scored on seven-point scales, from “Never” to 
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“Daily.” The mean levels of distress were also computed for the 16-item scale, scoring from 1.00 
to 7.00, identifying job strain at lower levels and risk of burnout at higher levels. 
The measures of career satisfaction [17], professional equity [18] and daily distress [23] were 
validated in a Canadian cross-national sample among different medical specialties. 
4.2.2. Statistical Analysis 
To study differences in the levels of career satisfaction, fulfillment-recognition rewards, and 
daily distress among physicians paid by the three remuneration methods (FFS, blended, and 
APP) and gender, a multivariate analysis of variances (MANOVA) was conducted using the 
general linear model [24] of SPSS® 20, and the Wilks’ Lambda criterion was considered. 
Multiple comparisons were performed as post-hoc tests. 
4.3. Results 
Of the 794 eligible physicians in the SHR, a total of 382 completed the questionnaire 
(response rate=48.1%). The majority of the questionnaires, two thirds, were completed on paper 
and the other third was submitted on-line. In the sample, 37.2% (n=142) were female physicians 
and 62.8% (n=240) were male. Slightly less than half (45.3%) of the physicians were 
remunerated by FFS, 24.6% by APP, and 30.1% were under mixed models. Table 4-1 presents 
the distribution of payment methods by gender. The reliability for the measures of well-being 
(career satisfaction, fulfillment-recognition equity, and daily distress scales) was very high 
(Table 4-2). The three dependent variables were found to be moderately correlated: career 
satisfaction and fulfillment-recognition equity (r=0.66, p<0.001); career satisfaction and daily 
distress (r=-0.53, p<0.001); and, fulfillment-recognition equity and daily distress (r=-0.40, 
p<0.001).  
The MANOVA test (Wilks’ Lambda criterion) identified that the three dependent variables 
were significantly affected by gender, F (3,374)=2.83, p=0.04, but not by the payment method, 
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F(6,748)=1.02, p=0.41; moreover, there was no evidence of an interaction effect between 
payment method and gender, F(6,748)=1.2, p=0.3. In addition, the box’s M was 33.84, p=0.32, 
holding the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices. 
Table 4-1. Payment methods and demographics by gender 
 
All physicians 
n=382 
Women 
142 (37.2%) 
Men 
240 (62.8%) 
Payment method    
FFS 173 (45.3%) 59 (41.5%) 114 (47.5%) 
Blended 115 (30.1%) 44 (31%) 71 (29.6%) 
APP 94 (24.6%) 39 (27.5%) 55 (22.9%) 
Age in years-old – mean (SD) 49.04 (11.4) 46.8(10.1) * 50.4(11.9)* 
Marital status    
Single 26 (6.9%) 14 (9.9%) 12 (5.1%) 
Married/common law 335 (88.4%) 118 (83.1%) 217 (91.6%) 
Separated/divorced 11 (2.9%) 6 (4.2%) 5 (2.1%) 
Widowed/other 7 (1.8%) 3 (2.1%) 3 (1.3%) 
Missing data 3 (0.8%) 3 (0.7%) - 
Specialty group    
Family/general practitioners 136 (35.6%) 57 (40.1%) 79 (32.9%) 
Medical specialties 120 (31.4%) 47 (33.1%) 73 (34.4%) 
Surgical specialties 99 (25.9%) 28 (19.7%) 70 (29.6%) 
Laboratory and medical images 27 (7.1%) 10 (7%) 17 (7.1%) 
Years in practice – mean (SD) 18.5 (12.3) 16(11) ** 19.9(12.8) ** 
*t(328.9)=-3.14, p=0.002; ** t(326.3)=-3.15, p=0.002; χ2 Tests were not significant, p-values >0.05. 
Table 4-2. Career satisfaction, professional fulfillment-recognition equity, and daily distress of 
physicians by gender and payment method 
Dependent 
variables 
α 
n=382 
Mean 
(SD) 
Gender 
 
Payment Method 
Interactio
n 
Women 
Mean 
(SD) 
Men 
Mean 
(SD) 
F-value 
FFS 
Mean 
(SD) 
Blende
d 
Mean 
(SD) 
APP 
Mean 
(SD) 
F-
value 
F-value 
Career 
satisfaction 0.84 
4.23 
(0.68) 
4.14 
(0.57) 
4.27 
(0.63) 60.7**  
4.19 
(0.63) 
4.26 
(0.63) 
4.25 
(0.63) 0.15 1.61 
Fulfillment-
recognition 
equity 
0.86 4.24 (0.72) 
4.15 
(0.71) 
4.29 
(0.72) 6.18**  
4.14 
(0.73) 
4.29 
(0.71) 
4.34 
(0.69) 1.70 3.41
+ 
Daily 
distress 0.87 
3.31 
(0.89) 
3.43 
(0.84) 
3.24 
(0.92) 5.07*  
3.34 
(0.95) 
3.22 
(0.86) 
3.36 
(0.81) 0.74 0.96 
α:Cronbach’s Alpha 
*p=0.03; **p=0.01; + p=0.02 
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Significant differences in the mean levels of career satisfaction, fulfillment-recognition 
equity, and daily distress were identified between female and male physicians (Table 4-2). 
Women scored lower levels of career satisfaction, F(1,376)=6.07, p=0.01, and fulfillment-
recognition equity than men, F(1,376)=6.18, p=0.01, and female physicians referred higher 
levels of daily distress compared to male physicians, F(1,376)=5.07, p=0.03. In contrast, no 
significant differences were identified by remuneration method. However, an interaction effect 
between gender and payment method on the mean levels of fulfillment-recognition equity was 
significant, F(2,376)=3.41, p=0.03, suggesting that the importance of intrinsic rewards is 
stronger among men with APP (Table 4-3). Caution in the interpretation is warranted, since this 
interaction could be a type I error due to the multiple comparisons performed. Therefore, the 
mean levels are shown with error bars for the three outcome variables (Figure 4-1).  
Table 4-3. Mean levels of physician’s professional equity, daily distress, and career satisfaction 
by payment method and gender 
Measurement 
payment 
method 
Gender n Mean (SD) 
Career Satisfaction 
FFS female 59 4.19 (0.57) male 114 4.20 (0.66) 
Blended female 44 4.13 (0.61) male 71 4.34 (0.64) 
APP female 39 4.09 (0.54) male 55 4.36 (0.52) 
Fulfillment-
recognition equity 
FFS female 59 4.18 (0.66) male 114 4.12 (0.76)T* 
Blended female 44 4.14 (0.73) 
male 71 4.39 (0.69)T 
APP female 39 4.11 (0.77)
+ 
male 55 4.51 (0.58)+* 
Daily distress 
FFS female 59 3.38 (0.91) 
male 114 3.32 (0.98) 
Blended female 44 3.35(0.88) male 71 3.15(0.85) 
APP female 39 3.58(0.68) male 55 3.20 (0.85) 
Significant pair-wise comparisons 
+ p=0.008; *p=0.003; Tp=0.03 
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4.4. Discussion 
This study found differences in the reported well-being between male and female physicians. 
There are inequalities in the perceptions of career satisfaction, professional equity and daily 
distress levels between female and male physicians that need attention. Female physicians, in 
comparison to men, report earning less [10, 25], experience less control over patient load and 
more time pressure to see their patients and, simultaneously, state that they see more patients 
with psychosocial problems [25, 26]. Further, female physicians experience additional stressors, 
like discrimination, lack of role models and support, and the challenge of balancing career and 
family spheres. Medical students have experiences of gender discrimination which result in 
resignation, influencing professional identity and choice of specialty among new female 
physicians [27]. Although the proportion of females among new cohorts [7] (including female 
professors) is increasing, they are still under-represented among positions in medical leadership 
[28]. Physicians who are mothers have more work-to-family conflicts compared to father 
physicians and to male or female physicians who are not parents [9]. These are critical factors 
that directly involve female physicians, new cohorts and current practitioners, as well as policy 
makers, since strategies to eliminate gender inequalities in the well-being of physicians are still 
required. In addition, these are facts that need to be considered when selecting and designing 
payment methods for practicing medicine. 
When comparing APP, blended methods, and FFS, it is positive that no significant differences 
were identified in the levels of daily distress, fulfillment-recognition equity and career 
satisfaction of physicians. In fact, since a lack of professional and clinical autonomy is associated 
with career dissatisfaction [29] and poor professional rewards [30], the findings indicate that 
alternative payment schemes, both blended forms and pure APP, do not threaten physicians’ 
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clinical autonomy. Moreover, the intrinsic and unalterable tensions of practicing medicine are 
not affected by alternative payment methods. 
Female physicians give more importance to issues such as control of work schedule and 
environment, and recognition for their work [25]. Since female physicians report higher 
percentage of complex patients [25], less control on daily aspects of practice [26], extra 
challenges to achieve work-life balance [5, 6, 9] and professional development [6, 10], 
alternative payment schemes should acknowledge these factors, providing the necessary 
flexibility to enhance their motivation. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Error bars of the three dependent variables by payment methods and gender 
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Given that this was a cross-sectional study, findings must be considered as associations. 
However, results can be extrapolated to physicians practicing in the SHR and the Regina 
Qu'Appelle Health Region and, with caution, to other similar regions across Canada. In 
comparison with other surveys among physicians, the response rate of this study is adequate; 
especially because response bias was tested and found to be negligible (Appendix F). Finally, 
sufficient numbers of specialists among the three payment methods were limited. National 
studies with bigger and stratified samples are needed to further explore the well-being of 
physicians. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Female physicians reported poorer levels of career satisfaction and professional equity, and 
higher levels of daily distress in comparison to male physicians. These findings are evidence of a 
lack of gender equity in the well-being of practitioners which needs to be addressed. APP and 
blended payment methods did not show differences in the well-being indicators when compared 
to traditional FFS. APP have been recommended to engage physicians in research and academic 
duties, as well as administrative responsibilities [31], along with providing incentives for health 
promotion and preventive services [32]; while FFS has been described as adequate to reward 
high quantities of clinical care [33]. Finally, it is recommended to study the potential interaction 
effect between APP and gender with stratified samples across provinces. 
4.6. Contributions of the Third Article to the Dissertation 
Gender differences were confirmed among wellness indicators. Female physicians perceived 
lower professional equity and higher daily distress, as well as a reduced career satisfaction, in 
comparison to male physicians. Multiple comparisons suggested latent gender inequalities 
according to payment methods, specifically in the perception of fulfillment-recognition equity.  
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Higher levels of equity were identified among male physicians paid by APP in comparison to 
male physicians with FFS. Notwithstanding, this benefit could not be observed among female 
physicians. The potential benefit of APP to enhance the perception of professional equity appears 
to be provided inequitably by gender. Similar differences on the benefits of APP to improve 
career satisfaction and reduce daily distress could be suggested, although no significant 
differences were identified in the present study. Taking into account the growing participation of 
women in medical practice and the differences in the wellness of female and male physicians, 
professional and personal needs of female physicians should be considered when designing 
payment methods in order to promote wellness among them. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1. Discussion 
Canadian Ministries of Health, Medical Societies, and Faculties of Medicine recognize that 
alternative payment plans (APP) have been contributing to the recruitment and retention of 
physicians (i.e., in rural and remote areas), the promotion of collaborative care, and the 
encouragement of preventive care and health promotion services within the Canadian health 
care system [1]. APP are also important to promote the involvement of physicians in research, 
teaching, and administrative responsibilities [2, 3]. Payment systems affect the behavior of 
physicians, as well as health care inputs and outcomes [1]. Given that attitudes of individuals 
influence their behavior [4] and that behavior of physicians is affected by payment methods 
[1, 2, 5, 6], it is important to have a better understanding of how payment systems motivate 
physicians and promote their wellness [7-9].  
This dissertation has established that payment systems, along with personal, organizational 
and contextual factors, affect the perception of professional equity and daily distress of 
physicians [7, 8]. In the evaluation of wellness of physicians and payment schemes for 
practicing medicine, the importance of considering the role of age [7, 8], gender [8, 9], and 
specialty group [7] was highlighted. A protective contribution of career satisfaction on daily 
distress perceived by physicians was demonstrated [8], as well as the association of 
professional equity and career satisfaction as short and long term indicators of motivation [9]. 
Also, working conditions (e.g. workload, proportion of patients with complex conditions, time 
dedicated to academic and administrative duties) are important factors to consider when 
studying the impact of payment methods on the wellness of physicians [7, 8].  
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Taken into account working and personal factors, it was identified that APP are capable of 
enhancing the perception of professional equity among physicians, especially among family 
practitioners (FPs) [7] and have the potential to encourage provision of care for patients with 
complex conditions by decreasing daily distress [8]. 
In contrast to fee-for-service (FFS) payments, APP can provide a balance between 
contributions and rewards of physicians, improving perceived income and recognition equity. 
Non-FFS payment methods are an option for enhancing the motivation of dissatisfied physicians, 
offering financial equity and promoting recognition through appropriate non-financial incentives 
[7].  
On the one hand, financial incentives have limited influence on motivating physicians [10-
12], undermining their intrinsic motivation [11], showing a negligible impact on the quality of 
care [10-12], and challenging the performance of complex cognitive tasks [11]. On the other 
hand, non-financial incentives (e.g., supports for career and professional development, 
professional autonomy, practice collaboration, work-life balance, etc.) can have a positive effect 
on motivating medical practitioners and enhancing the quality of care [13-15]. Both types of 
incentives need to be considered for physicians because their motivation is complex and requires 
the understanding of multiple factors, such as relevance of professional autonomy [11, 16-18], 
limited effect of financial incentives [10-12], and potential benefits of non-financial incentives 
[13-15]. A balanced combination of financial and non-financial incentives could have a 
synergistic impact on motivation and the wellness of physicians, as well as on patient outcomes 
[14].   
Financial disparities [19] and poor wellness [20, 21] have been described among FPs in 
comparison to other medical specialties. APP could play a significant role to overcome these 
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disparities [7] and to motivate FPs to be leaders of primary health care reforms. Inter-
professional primary health care teams and group networks, supported by alternative payment 
models, are key components for the transformation of primary health care in Canada [22]. Inter-
professional and team-based health care models are particularly necessary at the primary health 
care level since health care systems with strong primary care infrastructures have healthier 
populations, fewer health-related disparities, and lower overall costs for health care [23, 24]. 
APP promote collaborative and inter-professional care [1] and physicians paid by APP report 
greater motivation and wellness (i.e., higher professional equity and reduced daily distress) [7, 
8]. The encouragement of inter-professional primary health care models can support the health 
care needs of an increasing number of patients with chronic and complex medical conditions 
[25]. Adequate time is particularly challenging for physicians in providing care for patients with 
complex conditions (i.e., elderly patients with multimorbidity); appropriate time is important to 
promote participation of patients and their families in medical decision processes [26]. 
Physicians in Europe and North America consider that the time allocated to their patients is less 
than the time that patients actually require [27], adding an extra tension to the inherent distresses 
of medical practice.  
Patient safety and quality of care have been associated with stress that physicians experience 
[28-30]. Daily distress of physicians is associated with payment systems [8]; this association is 
affected when practitioners see patients who with complex conditions [8, 31]. Medical 
practitioners paid by FFS experience distress when examining and treating patients who have 
complex conditions [31]. Physicians feel the “frustration that ‘money rules’ creating ethical 
dilemmas when everyone is trying to avoid these patients, in spite of their needs” [26]. In 
contrast, physicians paid by APP can devote more hours to indirect patient care and direct patient 
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care in other settings [2]; also, APP could support inter-professional, collaborative health care 
delivery, and a better quality of care [1]. The provision of care for complex patients requires time 
[26, 27] and adequate payment systems [26]; therefore, APP could be a tool to decrease distress 
among physicians and indirectly provide better quality of care for patients who have complex 
conditions [8]. Notwithstanding, several factors associated with the distress of physicians need to 
be acknowledged, such as working environment [8, 32, 33], workload [8, 34], academic and 
administrative duties [8, 35, 36], professional autonomy [18], career satisfaction [37, 38], 
medical specialty [36], payment methods [8, 18, 39], and gender [9, 40].  
Female physicians face additional stressors in their medical practice [9, 40-49], such as work-
life conflicts [43-45], less income [42, 46], unequal objective professional success [47], under-
representation among certain medical specialties and leadership positions [48, 49], as well as 
poor wellness indicators (e.g., poor professional equity, a high daily distress, and  low career 
satisfaction) [9]. Additionally, female physicians, especially younger ones, are more likely to be 
paid by APP [50]. As observed among three Canadian provinces, 57% of female physicians 
under 40 years old are paid by APP compared to 28.3% of females practitioners over 60 years 
old [50]. The enhancement of professional equity offered by APP presented in this dissertation 
[7, 9] might only be present among male physicians [9]. Unequal benefits of APP in promoting 
wellness between male and female physicians require further attention to eliminate existing 
disparities and acknowledge differences in their medical practices. Consequently, APP need 
appropriate adjustments for female physicians to enhance their motivation [9].  
The manner in which female physicians practice medicine needs to be recognized as a critical 
contribution to the provision of health services [51-53]. Changes in delivery of care and patient-
physician relationships can be observed with more women in medical practice [52]. Women's 
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communication style improves health care quality by increasing patients' adherence to 
treatments, encouraging patient involvement, and decreasing medical malpractice [53]. 
Moreover, the way that female physicians engage patients in health care decision processes also 
needs to be acknowledged [52].  
Finally, the findings of this dissertation are associations. Longitudinal studies are required to 
evaluate the effect of payment systems on motivation, wellness, and behavior of physicians. 
Also, the advantages of each payment system need to be acknowledged and promoted for the 
most suitable health care scenarios[1-3, 6-8], taking into account that physicians self-select their 
payment method [2, 6]. It is important to highlight that there is no ideal payment model for all 
medical practice settings [1, 5, 22, 54]. Hutchison et al. [22] state that “no single funding or 
payment method holds the key to transforming primary health care… Organizational change and 
improved quality of care are possible through varied arrangements for remunerating physicians.”  
5.2. Conclusions 
Payment methods have been associated with the perception of professional equity of 
medical practitioners. Enhanced levels of professional equity were observed among physicians 
paid by APP in comparison to those paid by FFS. Physicians paid by APP perceived fair 
economic rewards and appropriate recognition. Particularly, FPs paid by APP perceived 
higher professional equity than those FPs paid by FFS. By supporting professional equity 
among FPs, APP could promote interdisciplinary models of care and improve the provision of 
primary health care. 
Payment methods have been associated with daily distress of physicians when adjusted for 
other factors. Lower levels of daily distress can be predicted among physicians paid by APP 
who see high proportions of patients with complex conditions. Thus, APP could benefit the 
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wellness of practitioners and potentially improve the quality of care for patients with complex 
conditions. 
A poorer professional equity, a higher daily distress, and a lower career satisfaction were 
identified among female physicians in comparison to their male colleagues. In addition to the 
differences in the wellness of female and male physicians, there could be an inequitable 
impact of APP by gender. The impact of APP on the perception of professional equity was 
observed only among male physicians. Consequently, APP must recognize existing 
differences in the wellness of practitioners by gender. 
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APPENDIX A
    QUESTIONNAIRE 
 Satisfaction and Professional Equity of Physicians in the SHR 
 
1. Please describe your practice arrangements. Many doctors see patients  in a variety of settings  (in their 
private medical office, in the hospital, in a nursing home, rehabilitation facility or other setting) and some 
doctors see patients only in one of these settings. 
 
1.1  Where do you see your patients? (Please indicate approximate % per week among the following items)
  In your private practice office    %   
  In hospital emergency room or out‐patient department  %   
  In the treatment/diagnostic units or wards of the hospital  %   
  In a nursing home or rehabilitation facility  %   
  Home visits   %   
    Other settings(specify) ___________________________  %   
  TOTAL  100  %   
       
1.2  The organization of your practice. (Please mark “yes” or “no” for each item) Yes  No
  Are you in solo practice?  [     ]  [     ]
  Are you in individual practice within a group setting?   [     ]  [     ]
  Do you maintain more than one practice office?  [     ]  [     ]
  Does your main practice share or pool revenues?  [     ]  [     ]
  Does your main practice share office expenses?  [     ]  [     ]
  Does your main practice share staff?  [     ]  [     ]
  Does your main practice share equipment?  [     ]  [     ]
  Does your main practice share medical records?  [     ]  [     ]
  Are you accepting new patients?  [     ]  [     ]
     
1.3  How many patients do you see in an average week? (Please indicate the number of patients per week)
  Regular Hours 
  On Call 
1.4  Of ALL the patients you see in an average week, approximately what percent have 
(Please indicate approximate percentages among the following items) 
  ROUTINE conditions, given your specialty  %
  COMPLEX conditions, given your specialty  %
  SERIOUS personal/family problems (drug abuse, battering etc.)  %
    BOTH complex medical conditions & serious personal/family problems  %
  TOTAL  100 %
1.5  In your MEDICAL PRACTICE, what proportions of your income come from
(Please indicate approximate percentages among the following items) 
  Fee‐For‐Service (FFS)  %
  Salary  %
  Alternative Payment Programs (APP)  %
    Others (specify)_______________________  %
  TOTAL  100 %
1.6  Are the following elements included in your reimbursement arrangements?  
  (Please mark “Yes” or “No” for each item) Yes No
  Payment by salary  [     ] [     ]
  A contract with the Saskatoon Health Region  [     ] [     ]
  A contract with the University of Saskatchewan  [     ] [     ]
  The invoicing of some services on a fee‐for‐service basis  [     ] [     ]
  Ability to enter into contractual agreements with other parties  [     ] [     ]
  Flexibility to decide the number of hours you work every month   [     ] [     ]
  Independence to manage costs of delivering your professional services  [     ] [     ]
Ability to select and organize your team (eg. physicians, nurses, therapists, etc.)  [     ] [     ]
Benefits from any pension, group life, long‐term disability plan, or any other plan  [     ] [     ]
Other provisions (specify) _____________________________________________  [     ] [     ]
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1.7      Group Settings. (Please indicate if you have available the following health professionals for your patients) 
In my group we have services available from:  PART‐time   FULL‐time   By consult or referral  Do not have 
Physiotherapist(s) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Dietician(s) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Midwife(ves) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Nurse practitioner(s) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Psychologist(s) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Social worker(s) [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
Others (specify)______________________ [   ] [   ] [   ]  [   ]
 
2. Regular Working Hours per Week. To establish the structure of your time, we first ask you about regular 
hours and then On Call duties (See point 2.2. On Call below). First regular hours. 
 
2.1  On Regular Hours. (Please indicate how many hours you spend on the following activities) 
2.1.1  Direct Patient Care     
  Direct Patient Care which does not involve teaching or research    Hours per week
  Direct patient care involving either teaching or research    Hours per week
2.1.2  Indirect Patient Care     
  Communicating care plans to other health professionals    Hours per week
  Charting, telephone calls & other patient‐related duties    Hours per week
2.1.3  Non‐patient care Teaching & Research    
  Lecturing or preparing materials, marking, evaluating    Hours per week
  Research activities, collecting & analyzing data, writing etc.    Hours per week
2.1.4  Maintaining Knowledge     
  Obtaining CME credits, keeping up with medical literature, participating in     Hours per week
  patient care conferences/rounds, and/or Attending symposia/conferences     
2.1.5  Administrative Duties     
  Administrative tasks associated with your practice    Hours per week
  Other service, organizational, or administrative duties    Hours per week
  Total number of hours you work on regular hours (Sum all items above)    Hours per week 
2.2  On Call & Call Backs. 
   
How many WEEKDAY evenings (Mon‐Fri) 
are you On Call in an average month? 
None 
1‐2   
per 
month 
3‐4   
per 
month 
5‐6   
per 
month 
7‐8   
per 
month 
9‐12 
per 
month 
13‐17 
per 
month 
18+  
per 
month 
         
How many SATURDAYS OR SUNDAYS in an 
average month are you On Call?   
None   One  two  3 or 4  5 or 6  7 or 8 
             
         
2.3  Practice Changes. (Please mark “Decrease”, “No change” or “Increase” for each item below) 
What changes in your practice would you like to make? Decrease  No change  Increase   
  The number of patients you provide care to  [     ]  [     ]  [     ]   
  Your participation in teaching  [     ]  [     ]  [     ]   
  The range of clinical procedures or treatments that you provide  [     ]  [     ]  [     ]   
  Your participation in research activities  [     ]  [     ]  [     ]   
  Your involvement in medical administration  [     ]  [     ]  [     ]   
 
3. Changes and administrative issues in medical practice (Please indicate your perception with the following) 
Part 1:  Strongly disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree
The portion of complicated patients in my 
practices has increased during the last two years.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Patients have become more demanding in 
their requests during the last two years.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The proportion of elderly patients has 
increased.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
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Part 2:  Strongly disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree
I have had to increase my time commitment in 
serving on healthcare related committees.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The costs of staff in my medical practice have 
increased during the last two years.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The costs of equipment in my medical practice 
have increased during the last two years.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The costs of rent/lease/mortgage for my medical 
facilities have increased during the last two years.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
In my opinion participating in administrative 
meetings in the region is a waste of time.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
In my opinion participating in clinical meetings 
in the region is a waste of time.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
4. Career Satisfaction. (Please indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects of your career from being 
“very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”) 
 
How satisfied are you with:  Very Dissatisfied  Dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
your interactions and relationships with other 
physicians?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
the doctor‐patient relationships derived from 
providing patient care?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
the diversity of patients you see (age, types of 
clinical conditions, etc.)?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your success in meeting the needs of your 
patients?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your ability to access resources needed to 
treat your patients?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your capacity to keep up with advances in 
your clinical specialty?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your role in organizing treatment programs 
for patients in your community?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your interactions and relationship with 
nurses?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your interactions and relationship with health 
care administrators?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your authority to get your clinical decisions 
carried out?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your ability to control your work schedule?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your ability to keep responsibilities at work 
from intruding on your personal life?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your earnings as a physician during your 
medical career?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your career advancement in medicine?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
the way administrative aspects of your 
medical practice are handled?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your ability to maintain satisfying activities in 
the community (service, culture, church, etc.)?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Overall, your medical career, considering 
your various roles and responsibilities?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
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5. Professional Equity. Professional equity is defined as the balance between the contributions of physicians 
and  the  rewards  they  receive. Your  responses  to  the  following  statements will allow you  to assess  the 
contributions you make, the rewards you receive, and whether equity has been achieved or not achieved. 
(Please indicate your perception with each of the following aspects) 
Regarding fulfillment, consider the 
following aspects of your medical practice. 
Very Low  Low 
Moderately 
Low 
Moderately 
High 
High  Very High 
Your sense of gratification derived from 
providing care to patients is:  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your sense of contributing to society in 
your various roles as a physician is:  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The opportunities to use your most 
advanced clinical skills are:  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
The choices you have over the activities 
you carry out or participate in are:  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your sense of accomplishment from your 
work as a physician is:  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
How well does your income reflect:  Not  at  all  Slightly  Partially  Moderately  Mostly  Perfectly 
the time you spend on your duties?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your qualifications and training?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your responsibilities?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
the stresses of making risky decisions?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your years of experience?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
Regarding recognition, please consider the 
following aspects of your practice. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly 
disagree 
Slightly 
agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Patients often express their appreciation for 
the clinical care that you provide to them.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your contributions to the general well‐being 
of your region are appreciated.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your colleagues acknowledge extra efforts you 
make in carrying out your responsibilities. [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Nurses you work with show respect for you 
as a physician.    [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Administrators understand the stresses you 
experience as a physician.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your dedication as a physician has led to 
advances in your medical career.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
Your family understands the stresses you 
face as a physician.  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
Overall, the full range of rewards you receive for all the contributions you make are: 
Very 
Unfavourable  Unfavourable 
Somewhat  
Unfavourable  Fair 
Somewhat 
Favourable
Favourable  Very     
Favourable
[    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ] 
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6. Stress in your work. (Please indicate how often you feel stressed with each of the following aspects) 
How frequently do you:   Never 
A few  
times a 
year 
Once a 
month 
2 ‐ 3  
times a 
month 
Once a 
week 
2 ‐ 3 
times a 
week 
Every 
day 
have workdays which are so busy that you are 
physically exhausted at the end of the day?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
have such demanding workdays that you are 
emotionally drained at the end of the day?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
suffer from fatigue due to working late and/or 
nights?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
express impatience when people do not respond 
to requests as quickly as they should have?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
express anger when people at work make 
mistakes?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
have workdays when you can devote enough 
time to all of your patients?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel frustrated accessing facilities/services for 
patients?      [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel depressed because of the death or serious 
illness of a patient?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel that your work has desensitized your 
feelings/ emotions?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
experience frustration dealing with demanding 
patients?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
end up doing tasks which you think are outside of 
your responsibilities?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
cancel a personal or social activity in order to 
meet work commitments?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
experience conflict between responsibilities at 
work and at home?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel that you can concentrate on the tasks that 
should be done?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel that you are in control of your day‐to‐day 
working activities?   [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
feel confident that you have been able to do your 
work at a high standard of care?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
How would you rate your level of stress? 
Very Low 
[   ] 
Low 
[   ] 
Moderate 
[   ] 
High 
[   ] 
Very high 
[   ] 
 
How would you rate your level of health? 
Very poor 
[   ] 
Poor 
[   ] 
Fair 
[   ] 
Good 
[   ] 
Very Good 
[   ] 
 
 
7. Interruptions with personal  life. Patient care  responsibilities are carried out on a  round  the clock basis 
throughout the entire year, requiring the dedication of physicians on weekends, holidays, and on evenings 
and nights.     Most people working  in health care occupations experience  interruptions  in  their personal 
life,  due  to  their  job  responsibilities.  (On  the  next  page,  please  indicate  how  often  you  experience 
interruptions in your personal life) 
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How often does your medical career 
interfere with: 
Not 
applicable 
 Never 
A few
times a 
year
Once a 
month 
2‐3 
times a 
month 
Once a 
week 
2‐3
times a 
week
Every 
day 
being at home at the same time as your 
partner?    [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
taking part in recreational or social interests 
in the community?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
looking after my preschool children?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
getting children ready for school in the 
morning?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
picking up my children from school, or being at 
home when they come home from school?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
finding child care?      [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
taking care of household duties?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
being at home with family members?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
spending time with friends?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
looking after a dependent relative or 
parent?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
8. Demographics. (Please answer all the following items) 
 
                                                                             
8.1  What is your age?    years      8.2 Indicate your gender Female          Male    
                                                                             
8.3  Your main area of specialization      8.4 Other areas of specialization              
             
                                                                             
8.5  How many years have you been in practice?   Years                              
8.6    Select the hospital where you see 
most of your patients 
Royal University 
Hospital 
St. Paul’s 
Hospital 
Saskatoon 
City Hospital 
Other:_______  None   
[   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]   
8.7    Your current marital status 
Single 
Married / 
Common Law 
Separated 
/ Divorced 
Widowed  Other:________   
[   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]   
8.8    How many days a week does your 
partner work? 
Not 
applicable 
Less than 1 
day per week 
1 or 2 days 
per week 
3 or 4 days 
per week 
Full‐time   
[   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]   
8.9    In which age range do you have 
children living with you? 
None 
Under 2   
years old 
2 to 5  
years old 
6 to 18    
years old 
Over 18 years 
old 
 
[   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]   
 
9. Contact and results feedback. (If you wish to receive feedback regarding this study, please mark “yes” or 
“no” for each of the following items) 
     Yes  No   
  Would you like to receive a summary of the results of this study?  [     ]  [     ]   
  Would you like to participate in a workshop about the results of this study?   [     ]  [     ]   
  Would you like to receive abstracts of previous articles by this research group?  [     ]  [     ]   
 
Thank you for taking the time and effort to complete this survey. 
The results will be analyzed and reported in broad groups. 
Your identity will be held in strictest confidence. 
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Associate Vice-President Research – Health 
 (University of Saskatchewan)  
Vice-President Research and Innovation 
(Saskatoon Health Region)  
247-111 Research Drive 
Atrium Building, Innovation Place 
Saskatoon, SK S7N 3R2 
Phone: (306) 966 - 8745  
 
 
DATE:  July 5, 2011 
 
TO:  Dr. Rein Lepnurm 
  School of Public Health 
  University of Saskatchewan 
 
FROM:  Martha E. (Beth) Horsburgh 
  Associate Vice-President Research – Health (University of Saskatchewan)/ 
Vice-President Research & Innovation (Saskatoon Health Region) 
 
RE:  RESEARCH ETHICS BOARD (REB) #: B2011-140 
PROJECT NAME: The Impact of Alternative Payment Programs (APP) on the 
Satisfaction and Professional Equity of Physicians: A Study in the Saskatoon 
Health Region 
  PROTOCOL #: N/A 
 
 
Saskatoon Health Region is pleased to provide you with operational approval of the 
above-mentioned research project. 
 
Kindly inform us when the data collection phase of the research project is completed. 
We would also appreciate receiving a copy of any publications related to this research. 
As well, any publications or presentations that result from this research should include a 
statement acknowledging the assistance of Saskatoon Health Region.  
 
We wish you every success with your project.  If you have any questions, please feel 
welcome to contact Shawna Weeks at 655-1442 or email 
shawna.weeks@saskatoonhealthregion.ca 
 
Yours truly, 
 
 
 
Martha E. (Beth) Horsburgh, RN, Ph.D 
Associate Vice-President Research – Health (University of Saskatchewan)/ 
Vice-President Research & Innovation (Saskatoon Health Region) 
 
cc:   Dr. David Poulin, Vice President, Medical Affairs, SHR 
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OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
Permission to use copyrighted material in doctoral dissertation
jha <jha@sciedu.ca> 21 August 2014 12:20
To: juan.nicolas.ps@usask.ca
Cc: "Lepnurm, Rein" <r.lepnurm@usask.ca>
Dear Dr. Juan-Nicolas Pena-Sanchez,
Thank you very much for your letter and information! The papers' copyright in JHA belongs to the authors. So we
approved. You can reprint them in your dissertation. Thanks again for your interest in our journal! I look forward to
collaborating with you next time.
If you have any other questions, please don’t hesitate to contact with me at: jha@sciedu.ca.
Sincerely yours,
Edith Lecea
On 8/20/2014 7:46 PM, Juan-Nicolas Pena-Sanchez wrote:
August 20, 2014
Sirs
Editorial Board
Journal of Hospital Administration
Re.: Permission to use copyrighted material in doctoral dissertation
Dear Sirs:
I am a graduate student of the University of Saskatchewan, completing my Doctoral dissertation
entitled “Effects of Alternative Payment Plans on Daily Distress and Professional Equity of
Physicians”. I would like to ask for permission to reprint in my dissertation the following articles that
have been published in your journal:
Peña-Sánchez JN, Lepnurm R, Dobson R, Keegan D. Impact of payment methods on
professional equity of physicians. Journal of Hospital Administration. 2014; 3(2):50-60.
Peña-Sánchez JN, Lepnurm R, Dobson R, Keegan D, Bermedo-Carrasco S. Payment method
as a predictor of the daily distress experienced by physicians. Journal of Hospital
Administration. 2014; 3(5):1-13. 
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 REPRINT PERMISSION
web catalogue, and also through web search engines. I will also be granting University of
Saskatchewan an authorization to reproduce, loan, and distribute single copies of my dissertation.
Please confirm in writing or by e-mail that these arrangements meet with your approval.
Sincerely,
Juan-Nicolás Peña-Sánchez
PhD candidate, School of Public Health, University of Saskatchewan
-- 
Edith Lecea,
Editorial Assistant 
Journal of Hospital Administration, Sciedu Press
-------------------------------
1120 Finch Avenue West, Suite 701-309, Toronto, ON., M3J3H7, Canada
Tel: 1-416-479-0028 ext. 213       
Fax: 1-416-642-8548
E-mail: jha@sciedu.ca   
http://www.sciedu.ca/jha
Peña-Sánchez JN, Lepnurm R, Bermedo-Carrasco S. Latent gender inequalities in the well-
being of physicians according to payment method for practicing medicine. Journal of Hospital
Administration. 2013; 2(4): 7-14. 
The articles will have the appropriate citations. The requested permission extends to any future
publication of my dissertation by the University of Saskatchewan. These rights will in no way restrict
republication of the material in any other form by the Journal of Hospital Administration or by others
authorized by the Journal.
My dissertation will be available in full-text on the internet for reference and study. The electronic
version will be accessible through the University of Saskatchewan Library web page, the Library’s
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APPENDIX E 
ONE PAGE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Satisfaction and Professional Equity of Physicians in the SHR 
 
We understand that you may not have time to complete the full questionnaire, as about half of your 
colleagues have.  In order to validate their questionnaires we ask you to complete this single page.  
 
1. Career Satisfaction. (Please indicate your satisfaction with the following aspects of your career) 
How satisfied are you with:  Very Dissatisfied  Dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
Somewhat 
Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Very 
Satisfied 
your doctor‐patient relationships derived 
from providing patient care?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your success in meeting the needs of your 
patients?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your authority to get your clinical decisions 
carried out?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your ability to keep responsibilities at work 
from intruding on your personal life?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your career advancement in medicine?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
your medical career, considering your various 
roles and responsibilities?  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
2. Overall, the full range of rewards you receive for all the contributions you make are: 
Very 
Unfavourable  Unfavourable 
Somewhat  
Unfavourable  Fair 
Somewhat 
Favourable
Favourable  Very     
Favourable
[    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ]  [    ] 
 
3. Stress in your work: 
How would you rate your level of stress? 
Very Low 
[   ] 
Low 
[   ] 
Moderate 
[   ] 
High 
[   ] 
Very high 
[   ] 
 
4. Demographics. (Please answer all the following items) 
                                                                             
4.1  What is your age?    years      4.2 Indicate your gender Female          Male    
                                                                             
4.3  How many years have you been in practice?   Years                              
                                     
4.4    Select the hospital where you see 
most of your patients 
Royal University 
Hospital 
St. Paul’s 
Hospital 
Saskatoon 
City Hospital 
Other:_______  None   
[   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]  [   ]   
             
 
Thank you for taking the time and effort to complete this survey. 
The results will be analyzed and reported in broad groups. 
Your identity will be held in strictest confidence. 
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APPENDIX F 
BIAS CHECK RESULTS 
Of the 794 eligible physicians, 382 participated in the study (response rate = 48.1%). 
Of the 412 physicians who did not participate, 73 completed the one-page questionnaire 
(Appendix E) which was sent by mail in the last reminder. The responses of the 73 
physicians could represent the characteristics of the 412 physicians who did not 
participate in this study. 
Among physicians who completed the one-page survey, the mean age was 50.62 
(SD=12.93) years. By gender, 24.7% (n=18) were females and 75.3% (n=55) were males. 
The overall mean levels of efforts/rewards equity, stress, and career satisfaction were 
5.11/6.00 (SD=1.47), 3.52/6.00 (SD=0.88), and 4.79/7.00 (SD=1.02), respectively.  
No significant differences were identified according to gender (p=0.05) and age 
(p=0.29) between those who completed the one-page questionnaire and those who 
participated in the study. Similarly, there were no significant differences found in 
reported overall equity, stress, and satisfaction between these two groups of physicians 
(p>0.05). 
Characteristic 
One-page survey 
(n = 73) 
Participants 
(n = 382) 
 n(%) / mean(SD) n(%) / mean(SD) 
Gender   
Female  18 (24.7)*  142 (37.2)* 
Male 55 (75.3)*  240 (62.8)* 
Age 50.62 (12.93) † 49.04 (11.40) † 
Overall efforts/rewards balance 5.11 (1.47) † 5.08 (1.36) † 
Overall stress 3.52 (0.88) † 3.07 (0.84) † 
Overall career satisfaction 4.79 (1.02) † 4.62 (0.91) † 
† T-tests with p>0.05 
* χ2 with p=0.05 
 
